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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a push for legislative "reform" of "takings law" to provide
greater protection for land owners has been referred to as a national
"movement." As evidence of this movement, it is common to note that various
types of legislative proposals have been introduced in Congress and in virtually
every state, and that many states have adopted some type of reform. This
national pattern of legislative action raises specific issues about takings reform.
It also raises more general questions concerning how a national movement for
reform develops, and how this movement is shaped by the unique
circumstances of each state.
This Article addresses these two types of questions by considering both the
national and South Carolina experiences with takings reform proposals. Part II
presents the doctrinal background by summarizing and discussing three "facts
of life" concerning the constitutional takings doctrine. Part III provides further
understanding of what the national movement means in terms of state
legislation by reviewing the response to reform proposals throughout the states.
Part IV places the South Carolina experience within this national experience
by discussing the takings reform proposals considered by the South Carolina
legislature. Part V makes several observations concerning takings reform
proposals in general and illustrates these by reference to South Carolina.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF "TAKINGS" LAW
A. The Requirement of Compensation for a "Taking"
The right to compensation for a governmental taking of property is based
on both the federal and state constitutions. The Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation."' This mandate has been deemed
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applies to state
governments.2 In addition, state constitutions generally contain equivalent
protection. For example, the South Carolina Constitutionprovides that "private
property shall not be taken... for public use without just compensation being
first made therefor."3 These compensation provisions are relatively easy to
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see also JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY
OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed. 1998) (offering a
historical perspective on the Just Compensation Clause in terms of property rights in the United
States).
2. See Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
3. S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 13.
1998]
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apply in situations involving a straightforward, physical appropriation of land
for a public use like a highway.
However, difficulties arise when governmental action consists only of rules
and regulations that impose limitations on an owner's use of land. In most
situations, these impositions are viewed as burdens an individual is subject to
as a citizen and land owner.4 From this perspective, the exercise of the "police
power" of the government, which has traditionally been used to prohibit public
and private harms, does not involve a taking of property, even if the restriction
involved results in a substantial loss in the economic value of the land.5 For
example, zoning restrictions on land generally do not constitute takings.6
However, under some circumstances, the imposition of restrictions and burdens
on land use can constitute a "regulatory taking" if the restrictions are
unwarranted or too extensive. Such burdens "should be borne by the public as
a whole . . . ." The problem is thus one of line-drawing: How does one
distinguish mere regulations from a regulatory taking?
B. Three Basic "Facts ofLife" About Regulatory Takings
Anyone attempting to answer this question soon encounters three basic
facts of life about regulatory takings. First, no set formula, test, standard, or
guideline provides a reasonably easy and reliable method for identifying a
taking. Second, the legal process of identifying a regulatory taking question
can be very expensive and time-consuming. Third, regulations can have
substantial negative impact on a property owner but still not constitute a taking.
4. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491-92
(1987) (citations omitted):
Under our system of government, one of the State's
primary ways of preserving the public weal is
restricting the uses individuals can make of their
property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by
such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the
restrictions that are placed on others. These
restrictions are "properly treated as part of the burden
of common citizenship." Long ago it was recognized
that "all property in this country is held under the
implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not
be injurious to the community," and the Takings
Clause did not transform that principle to one that
requires compensation whenever the State asserts its
power to enforce it.
5. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384-95 (1926)
(holding that alleged reductions in value as a result of a zoning ordinance from $10,000 per acre
to $2,500 per acre and from $150 per front foot to $50 per front foot were not an unconstitutional
taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915) (holding that the prohibition against
brickyard operation that allegedly resulted in a reduction in value from $800,000 to $60,000 was
lawful).
6. See, e.g., Ambler, 272 U.S. at 384-95 (holding that zoning ordinance did not
amount to a taking).
7. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (quoting
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
[Vol. 50: 93
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1. There Is No "Set Formula "for Identifying a Regulatory Taking
The United States Supreme Court summarized the lack of a substantive test
for identifying a taking as follows:
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of
the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of
considerable difficulty. While this Court has recognized that
the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee... [is] designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole," this Court, quite simply, has been
unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when
"justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused
by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few
persons. Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a
particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the
government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused
by it depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in
that] case."8
This lack of a set formula has not resulted from a lack of effort on the part
of judges and scholars. "Thousands of square miles of our nation have been
deforested to provide the paper to print the thousands-probably hundreds of
thousands-of books, articles, notes, comments, seminar papers, newsletters,
etc., dealing with regulatory takings."9 Nor has the lack resulted from a lack of
intelligence.
[N]o one is likely to discover aLoretto stone, so to speak, that
will unlock the secrets of the takings issue. The judges and
scholars who have addressed the issue in the twentieth
century are as intelligent a group as is likely to address it in
the twenty-first. The takings issue is muddy because it is
inherently hard to deal with, not because the people who have
addressed it haven't been smart enough to see the light.'
8. Id. at 123-24 (citations omitted).
9. Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Florida 's Private Property Rights Protection Act:
Does It Inordinately Burden the Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. Rv. 695, 696 (1996); see, e.g.,
CAROL M. RosE, PROPERTYANDPERSUASION 49 (1994) ("Scholars havejoinedjudges in spilling
a great deal of ink over takings .... ).
10. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORYTAKINGS: LAw,ECONOMICS, AND POLITICs 325
(1995); see, e.g., James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1143,
1150 (1997) (noting that the meaning of "taking" is inherently uncertain, which creates a
problem in the takings area because "(a]mbiguity and uncertainty ... are likely to provoke
unusual anxiety when we sense them at the heart of our political-economic system."). The phrase
"Loretto stone" in the textual quote above is a reference to Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), which attempted to provide a test of regulatory taking based
1998]
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a. Problems Causing Lack of a Set Formula
Regulatory takings are "inherently hard to deal with"" for three reasons.
First, the matter is complex because regulations affecting the use of property
are extremely diverse. Second, takings decisions require a prior determination
of what rights are included in ownership. By definition, no taking results if a
regulation does not limit or interfere with any of the rights involved in
ownership. Thus, "in orderto say when governmental action 'takes' someone's
property, we must have some idea about what rights are included in property
in the first place."' 2 Third, any formula that addresses the problems of
complexity and ownership rights must be adopted by a majority ofjudges on
a given court. In particular, a formula for interpreting the Fifth Amendment
must be adopted by at least five Supreme Court justices both at the time of a
particular decision and, if the formula is to be effective across time, as new
takings cases are decided.
(1) Complexity
Legal restrictions affect property in so many diverse ways that it is
impossible to devise a rule or set of rules which is both precise enough to
provide relatively clear, certain answers and general enough to cover the
variety of regulations that affect property values. This diversity in restrictions
can be illustrated by considering the following examples of ways the law
regulates land use:
(1) agricultural use regulations, including such diverse restrictions as:
(i) prohibitions on growing marijuana, even though this crop would be
significantly more profitable than any other crop; 3 (ii) requirements
concerning the use of pesticides and herbicides, even though these
requirements substantially reduce profitability; 4 and (iii) expensive
requirements that livestock waste be contained in a particular way on
site so that rain water will not carry it off site;
(2) common zoning techniques such as: (i) restrictions on an owner's use
of property, which can substantially reduce property value; 6 (ii) set-
on whether a physical invasion was involved. FISCHEL, supra at 318. However, Fischel indicates
that, in his view, the attempt failed and "[t]he lesson of Loretto is that there is no refuge in
making a 'bright-line' distinction between regulations and physical invasions." Id. at 320.
11. FiSCHEL, supra note 10, at 325.
12. ROSE, supra note 9, at 49.
13. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (making it
unlawful for a person to manufacture or distribute narcotics and other controlled substances,
including marijuana).
14. See, e.g., S.C. CODEANN. §§ 46-13-10 to -240 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1997)
(codifying South Carolina's Pesticide Control Act).
15. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-20-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (setting forth
specifications and requirements for animal waste storage ponds).
16. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384-95 (1926)
(upholding zoning use restriction despite a 75% reduction in property value); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915) (upholding restriction prohibiting use of property as a
[Vol. 50:93
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back requirements, which effectively prohibit use of significant
portions of one's land for construction; 17 and (iii) landscaping
requirements, which force a property owner to enhance the aesthetic
pleasure of those looking at the property; 8
(3) environmental rules barring: (i) water or air pollution; 9 (ii) the
destruction of wetlands and the beach/dune system;2  or (iii) the
destruction of habitat for an endangered species.2'
Complexity also results from the problems of identifying the "property" or
"property interest" at issue. There are two dimensions to this problem. First, if
a regulation prohibits the development of part of an owner's large tract of land,
what is the property at issue: the whole tract (in which case, only a partial
restriction is involved) or only the part subject to regulation (in which case, a
total restriction is involved)?22 Second, given the common conceptualization of
property rights as "sticks in a bundle," if a regulation totally eliminates one
stick, is the regulation viewed as a total taking of this stick or as a partial taking
of the bundle of sticks?24
brickyard despite a 92.5% reduction in property value).
17. Set-back regulations require that construction be "set back" a certain distance
from the property line. The result is that the owner must have a front, back, and side yard so that
the community will have more open space. The Supreme Court found set-back requirements to
be a constitutional exercise of the police power in Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927).
18. The power to use zoning to impose landscaping requirements is explicitly granted
in the South Carolina Local Government Comprehensive Planning Enabling Act of 1994. See
S.C. CODEANN. § 6-29-720(A)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (authorizing regulation of"aspects
of the site plan including, but not limited to, tree preservation, landscaping, buffers, lighting, and
curb cuts"). Such restrictions appear to be constitutional. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978) ("[T]his Court has recognized, in a number of settings, that
States and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by
preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city .... ); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (citation omitted) ("The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well
as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.").
19. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (requiring
permits for the additional discharge of wastes or air contaminates).
20. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-260 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (recognizing
the importance of preserving the beach/dune system).
21. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250(1)(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (noting
various policy reasons for conservation of beach/dune system, including habitat preservation).
22. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)
("[The regulation] accords with our 'takings'jurisprudence, which has traditionally been guided
by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the
'bundle of rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property.").
24. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,497,500-02
(1987) (refusing to accept the argument that total taking resulted because regulatory statute
"entirely destroys the value of their unique support estate," which was essentially a distinct stick
in the owner's bundle of property rights); infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
1998]
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(2) DeterminingRights andLimitations Relating to Property
Ownership
In order to determine whether a particular regulation is a taking of a
property "right," one must first determine what the property owner's rights are.
This determination is necessary because ownership, in itself, does not mean
that the owner has a right to do all things with the property. Property rights are
not absolute; they are, and always have been, subject to limitations. The
problem is that there is no general test for identifying these limitations. As a
result, the line between permitted and prohibited uses must be drawn on a case-
by-case basis. This lack of a test for defining rights presents a fundamental
problem: How can property rights serve as a limit on governmental power if
we have no standard for identifying property rights? Several possible
approaches can be used to address this problem, but each has shortcomings.
First, it is possible to avoid recognizing the problem by stating a question-
begging "rule" that covers all cases. For example, for centuries many courts
have avoided the problem in nuisance cases by resorting to a "rule" that
subjects the right to use land to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non kedas
("one should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of
another").25 In the takings context, the Supreme Court has noted:
Long ago it was recognized that "all property in this country
is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it
shall not be injurious to the community," and the Takings
Clause did not transform that principle to one that requires
compensation whenever the State asserts its power to enforce
it.
26
Such maxims have been widely recognized as question-begging because
they do not provide guidance until one first answers the question: What is an
injury?27 For example, if Ronald Rocker likes to listen to loud music in his
yard, and Nancy Nature loves to listen to the birds in her yard, the maxim about
rights is useless in a dispute between the two until one first determines whether
Rocker "injures" Nature because Rocker's music is so loud that Nature cannot
25. BLACK'S LAW DIcnONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
26. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 491-92 (citations omitted); see also Fertilizing Co. v.
Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667-68 (1878) (stating that the restraint of nuisances through the
exercise of the police power "rests upon the fundamental principle that every one shall so use
his own [property) as not to wrong and injure another .... 'Every right, from absolute ownership
in property down to a mere easement, is purchased and holden subject to the restriction that it
shall be so exercised as not to injure others."' (quoting Coates v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow.
585, 605 (N.Y. 1827))).
27. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (1992) (To win a takings case, the state "must
do more than proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses... [at issue] are inconsistent with
the public interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim such as
sic utere tuo ut alienun non Iedas."); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE








Second, it is possible to avoid addressing the problem by allowing the
government to set its own limits. From this perspective, property rights are
definedby the law of the state. As a result, an owner's rights are always subject
to a governmental determination of whether any particular use of the property
"harms" the public good or "harms" another person. The problem with this
approach is the lack of an independent standard for determining what
constitutes a proper exercise of the police power. Property rights become
simply a matter of "positive law"--i.e., what the legislature or courts say they
are. Such a result is contrary to the notion that the Fifth Amendment's Taking
Clause is designed to limit the government and thus protect property owners
from government abuse.
A third alternative to the problem is to adopt the view that there is some
"natural law" standard, separate from and independent of the positive law of
legislation and judicial opinions, that canbe used to define property rights. This
approach has the advantage of providing substantive content to the Takings
Clause thus providing a limit on the government. However, this approach
presents a new problem: How does one identify the property rights
independent of the legal system?
One common answer to this question is to refer to expectations embedded
in cultural tradition.29 Unfortunately, tradition provides only limited guidance.
In a pluralistic, dynamic society like the United States, agreement on the
content of tradition is hard to achieve. For example, both Justice Scalia and
Justice Kennedy agree that, in the context of regulatory takings, tradition
provides a standard that: (1) is independent of the statutes or judicial decisions
of a state; and (2) provides a workable guide to rights of ownership in the
context of regulatory takings. But they cannot agree what that tradition is.
3°
InLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council3' Justice Scalianoted that even
a loss of all economically viable use of land is not a taking if the proscribed
uses were never "part of... [the owner's] title to begin with. '31 Scalia bases
his position on "our 'takings' jurisprudence, which has traditionally been
guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the
28. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, Taking Persons Seriously: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Social Disputes in a Changing Neighborhood, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 15, 19-21
(1979) (using similar hypothetical in context of discussing the difficulty of awarding
entitlements).
29. Numerous other approaches have been proposed in addition to those discussed
in the text. For a sense of the diversity and complexity of the approaches to constitutional
interpretation, see Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory: Editor's Foreword, 65
FORDHAM L. Rav. 1247 (1997).
30. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, 1032 (1992).
31. Id. For a more detailed discussion of Lucas, see infra Part II.B.l.b. Justice Scalia
took a similar position about preexisting rights independent of state law in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), in which he asserted that, if a particular right is
inherent in property ownership, notice to a prospective buyer of a limit on that right is not a bar
to a future takings challenge. Id. at 833-34 n.2. For a more general takings argument in terms of
preexisting rights, see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1387-89 (1993).
32. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
1998]
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State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they acquire when they obtain
title to property., 33 This "constitutional culture"34 provides a reasonable
expectation standard: Some limits are reasonably expected by citizens and are
therefore proper;35 other limits are not reasonably expected and are therefore
improper.36 As to the content of this cultural tradition, Justice Scalia refers to
"relevant property and nuisance principles. 37
[R]egulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of
land ...cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A
law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved
in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely
affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or
by the State under its complementary power to abate
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise. 3'
In his concurring opinion in Lucas, Justice Kennedy also adopts a
culturally based standard, which he expresses in terms of "reasonable,
investment-backed expectations" to be used "[w]here a taking is alleged from
regulations which deprive the property of all value."39 This approach is
necessary to avoid "an inherent tendency towards circularity... for if the
owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a proper
exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what courts say
it is."' The cultural expectation standard provides an independent test that
makes itpossible to avoid this circularity because "[t]he expectations protected
by the Constitution are based on objective rules and customs that can be
understood as reasonable by all parties involved."'" However, Justice Kennedy
disagrees with Justice Scalia's emphasis on the common law as the basis for
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1028.
35. Id. at 1027.
It seems to us that the property owner necessarily
expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from
time to time, by various measures newly enacted by
the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers;
"[a]s long recognized, some values are enjoyed under
an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power."1
Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
36. Id. at 1030 ("When ... a regulation that declares 'off-limits' all economically
productive orbeneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background principles would
dictate, compensation must be paid to sustain it.").
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1029 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1035.
[Vol. 50: 93
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reasonable expectations as to property rights.
In my view, reasonable expectations must be understood
in light of the whole of our legal tradition. The common law
of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of
regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society.
The State should not be prevented from enacting new
regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions, and
courts must consider all reasonable expectations whatever
their source. The Takings Clause does not require a static
body of state property law; it protects private expectations to
ensure private investment.42
The relative merits of the respective positions of Justice Scalia and Justice
Kennedy are beyond the scope of this Article. For present purposes, the point
is that they cannot agree. Given this lack of agreement, it is unreasonable to
expect that cultural tradition can serve as an independent standard of property
rights.
The inadequacy of tradition as a standard to determine an owner's rights
is particularly important in the context of proposals for takings reform. Many
criticisms of existing takings law have arisen in situations where there is no
cultural agreement concerning where to draw the line between the rights of
ownership and the proper limits on those rights.4'3 For example, there is
considerable disagreement over whether a property owner has a right to build
an ugly parking lot; to demolish a unique historic structure; to build a strip mall
in a pretty, wooded area along the highway; or to fill in wetlands. To the extent
that legal regulations limiting these rights have been adopted and upheld, at
least one segment of society views the limits as a proper exercise of the police
power. However, not all people share this view. Much of the push for property
rights reform can be understood as a reaction to the impact on property rights
that has resulted from expanding the definition of "harm" to include such
values as aesthetics, historic preservation, and the preservation of the
"environment" (broadly defined to include such things as wildlife habitat and
natural scenery).44
(3) Multimember Appellate Courts
The requirement for majority agreement among appellate court members
presents another obstacle to establishing a set formula for takings. A central
feature of appellate courts in the United States is the use of the technique of
42. Id. (citation omitted).
43. See, e.g., FiSCHEL, supra note 10, at 352-57 (adopting a perspective in which
limits on property rights are measured largely by "standards exhibited by the community"); cf.,
e.g., Peter Karsten, Cows in the Corn, Pigs in the Garden, and "the Problem of Social Costs":
"High" and "Low" Legal Cultures of the British Diaspora Lands in the 17th, 18th, and 19th
Centuries, 32 L. & Soc'Y REv. 63 (1998) (presenting position that cultural views of rights are
central to resolution of disputes over trespassing animals).
44. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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"group decision."4 The United States Supreme Court and the state supreme
courts are all multimember courts that operate as a group and reach decisions
based on the principle that the majority rules in applying constitutional limits
like the Fifth Amendment. Justice Brennan's law clerks report that he
conducted an annual drill to advocate that the most important rule in
constitutional law is the "rule of five."' This rule was understood by the clerks
to mean either that "it takes five votes to do anything.... [or] with five votes
you could do anything."'47 Thus, if one is concerned with having a multimember
court adopt a test or formula to apply to a general type of case, one must get a
majority to agree not only on the result in a particular case, but also on the test.
Moreover, one must get a consistent majority that will, over time, continue to
adopt the formula and apply it consistently to all cases falling within its scope.
b. Illustration of Problems-Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council
The problems with developing a test determining when a regulation
becomes a taking can be illustrated by considering Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council." Lucas notes that the Supreme Court has generally eschewed
any "'set formula' for determining how far is too far" and has, instead,
preferredto "'engag[e] in... essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.' 49 However,
Lucas also asserts that the Supreme Court has
described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action
as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public
interest advanced in support of the restraint. The first
encompasses regulations that compel the property owner to
suffer a physical "invasion" of his property. In general (at
least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how
minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public
purpose behind it, we have required compensation....
The second situation in which we have found categorical
treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land."0
45. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 31-32
(1960).
46. Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 748,
763 (1995).
47. Id.
48. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
49. Id. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
50. Id. As an example of the first type of per se taking, the Court refers to Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The Lucas opinion asserts that
Loretto holds: "New York's law requiring landlords to allow television cable companies to
emplace cable facilities in their apartment buildings constituted a taking, even though the
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The dispute in Lucas involved two coastal lots that could notbe developed
because of a regulation designed to halt new construction between the beach
and an administratively determined erosion "baseline."'" Lucas had purchased
the lots before the enactment of the regulatory scheme, and the trial court held
that the lots had become valueless because of the development prohibition. 2
Given this impact on the utility and value of the land, the Supreme Court held
that a taking existed under the second category of per se takings. 3
Regardless of one's views as to whether a taking occurred in Lucas, the
two per se categories identifiedby the majority opinion inLucas do not provide
a "set formula" for even a limited class of regulatory takings. The first
category-physical invasions-does not provide a formula because many
physical invasions are not viewed as takings. These invasions, which are often
termed "exactments," include a wide range of constitutionally permissible
physical invasions of land: 4 For example, Dolan v. City ofTigard5 recognizes
that, as a condition for permission to expand a retail store, a city may exact a
dedication of land from a land owner so long as the city makes "some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.
'6
As to the second category, Lucas itself recognizes that the "total takings"
situations require case-by-case adjudication for two reasons. First, "the rule
does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to
be measured.""7 The importance of this uncertainty regarding the interest at
stake can be illustrated by considering how to apply this per se rule if Lucas
had owned a large, unsubdivided tract of land. Would a total taking have been
involved if the regulations resulted in a reduction in the number of developable
lots from twenty to eighteen when the tract was subdivided?5s Second, a total
51. Id. at 1006-09; S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
52. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07.
53. Id. at 1031-32.
54. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 9.11 to 9.23 (4th ed. Lexis
Law Publ'g 1997) (describing on and off-site improvements, impact fees, and other
considerations that municipalities may "exact" from builders); cf. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (holding that shopping center must accommodate person
exercising right of free speech granted by state in exercise of its police power).
55. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
56. Id. at 391.
57. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. For critiques of this aspect of Lucas, see, for
example, William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1407 (1993)
(arguing that nuisance law is too vague to clarify takings doctrine); William Funk, Revolution
or Restatement? Awaiting Answers to Lucas' Unanswered Questions, 23 ENVTL. L. 891, 898
(1993) (arguing that reliance on state nuisance doctrines may lead to divergent applications of
the takings doctrine in different states); John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds ofNuisance and
the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENvT. L. 1, 13 (1993) (arguing that adoption of common law
nuisance standard provides few "objective parameters" for legislative conduct); John A.
Humbach, "Taking" the Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and
Judicial Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771, 815 (1993) (arguing that
adoption of nuisance standard usurps proper legislative role of determining regulatory
legitimacy). For further discussion of the uncertainty resulting from the difficulty in defining
the property at issue, see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
58. For an example of such a problem, see Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,
28 F.3d 1171, 1179-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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loss of the economic value of the owner's land is not a taking if the proscribed
uses were never "part of... [the owner's] title to begin with."59 Because of this
limit, the "total loss" per se category cannot be applied until after one has
determined what uses were permitted prior to the adoption of the challenged
regulation.
Both Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy offer a cultural standard for this
determination;6 however, they disagree as to how one determines the content
of this standard. Arguably, Justice Scalia's narrow standard would not require
a case-by-case adjudication because it operates by reference to the existing law
of nuisance.6 However, nuisance law cannot provide an objective guide to
cultural standards ofproperty rights. In an oft repeated phrase, Prosser referred
to nuisance law as an "impenetrable jungle." 2 Justice Scalia's opinion refers
to a series of sections in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, apparently
believing that these will provide guidance into the "impenetrablejungle. 63 But
these sections merely list factors to be considered; they do not provide a test.
Moreover, they rely on vague terms like "harm," "social value," and
"suitability."
The problems of the multimembernature of courts also limit the usefulness
of Lucas in providing a clear standard. Only five judges joined the majority
opinion. Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, but disagreed as to the
standard to be applied.6 Justice Souter was of the view that the writ of
certiorari in Lucas should not have been granted.65 Justices Blackmun and
Stevens dissented on the merits.6 Justice White has now retired. Thus, only
four sitting justices joined in the majority opinion in Lucas. As a result, it is
uncertain as to how future courts will treat Lucas as precedent.67
59. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
60. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
62. W. PAGEKEETONETAL., PROSSERAND KEETON ONTHE LAW OF TORTs § 86, at 616
(5th ed. 1984). The authors note:
There is perhaps no more impenetrable
jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the
word "nuisance." It has meant all things to all people,
and has been applied indiscriminately to everything
from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked
in a pie. There is general agreement that it is
incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition.
Few terms have afforded so excellent an illustration
of the familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon a
catchword as a substitute for any analysis of a
problem; the defendant's interference with the
plaintiff's interests is characterized as a "nuisance,"
and there is nothing more to be said.
Id. at 616-17 (footnotes omitted).
63. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-3 1.
64. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
65. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1076-78 (statement of Souter, J.).
66. Id. at 1036-61 (Blackman, J., dissenting); id. at 1061-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. See RichardJ. Lazarus, Counting Votes andDiscounting Holdings in the Supreme
Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1099, 1140 (1997) (footnote omitted) ("The
Lucas majority view does not solve the puzzle; that decision is not even likely to be weighty
[Vol. 50: 93
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2. The Procedures for Identifying a Regulatory Taking Are
Expensive and Time-Consuming
Determining whether a taking has occurred is expensive and time-
consuming for two reasons. First, given the lack of a set formula for identifying
a taking,6 each case must be addressed upon its particular facts. Such case-by-
case adjudication results in lack of predictability and involves substantial time
and costs. Second, in order to avoid being overwhelmed with the task of
reviewing legislative and administrative decisions, courts have devised a
number of doctrines that have the effect of making it difficult to challenge
regulations on a takings theory.
One set of these doctrines consists of standards of review that favor the
validity of regulation. For example, courts usually give deference to legislative
determinations that aparticular concern merits restricting the use ofa particular
parcel of property.69 Though these deferential standards of review are justifiable
as a means of defining the proper role of courts, they also make it more difficult
and costly to prevail on a takings claim.
Another set of these doctrines is designed to force the owner to receive a
final decision by the regulatory agency involved before seekingjudicial review.
These doctrines are justifiable for two reasons. First, until such a final decision
is rendered, it would be wasteful to review it, given that the final result might
be sufficiently different so that no appeal or impropriety would result. Second,
until the agency has rendered its final decision, the court has no case or
controversy to adjudicate; the agency's final decision may satisfy the owner.
Consequently, there are constitutional problems with review of a decision
before it is final. For these reasons, courts refuse to review the decision until
the matter is "ripe" for review.7" In practice, the ripeness requirement can be a
substantial impediment to judicial review because land use regulation is often
very flexible. For example, a takings challenge to a denial of a particular
density for a residential development might be deemed not ripe for review
because the owner had not requested a variance from the rules. 7' Even with a
denial of a specific request for a variance, the city can argue that the owner
should have sought a lesser variance or should have sought rezoning. The net
result may be that an owner spends time and money seeking a judicial
precedent before the current court.").
68. See supra Part II.B.1.
69. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("If
the validityofthe legislative classification forzoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative
judgment must be allowed to control."). In the context of "exactions," which are requirements
imposed on an owner as a condition of receiving permission for a use that a governmental entity
might otherwise prohibit, no such deference is granted. Instead, the burden is on the government
to show that the exaction is not a taking. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395-96
(1994).
70. See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 54, at §§ 2.21 to 2.27 (chronicling ripeness and
finality rules in the context of takings litigation); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsTrrtuONAL LAW § 3-10 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing ripeness doctrine generally).
71. See, e.g.,Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'nv. HamiltonBank,473 U.S.
172, 186-94 (1985) (holding takings claim not ripe because of difficulty determining
individualized impact of regulatory scheme given that the owner had not sought a variance).
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determination only to be told to go back to the regulators.72
These difficulties of seeking review are further complicated in the federal
courts due to federalism concerns. As a result, federal courts often abstain from
hearing a takings case unless the federal right to compensation has been clearly
violated.73
3. Regulations Can Severely Reduce Economic Value Yet Not Be a
Taking
Because property use is viewed as subject to the police power, a person has
no right to a specific use, even an actual, existing use, if that use is lawfully
restricted by an exercise of the police power. As a result, it is often said that
ownership does not include the right to continue or undertake any particular
use.74 Therefore, because owners have no right to a particular use, any use may
be lawfully prohibited by a valid exercise of the police power. "The economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are,
of course, relevant considerations., 7 -' But these are only relevant, and not
dispositive, considerations. Severe economic impact, in itself, does not matter
so long as the land still has some value. 76 For example, the owner of an existing
lawful brickyard has not suffered a taking when a city, acting in lawful exercise
of the police power, prohibits the use of any land in the city for a brickyard and
thus causes the owner's land to decrease in value from $800,000 to $60,000.
77
Though this result is logically consistent with the view that rights are limited
by the police power, its impact on investment is extremely harsh and arguably
unfair in many circumstances. For this reason, the government does not
ordinarily exercise its power in this manner. For example, the "grandfathering"
of actual, existing uses is common.78 Nevertheless, the power exists, and there
can be situations where owners have no right to compensation even though a
new regulation has a tremendous negative effect on an owner's
investment-for example, where there is no grandfathering of existing uses or
where there is no existing use as yet, but the owner has made an investment
decision on the basis of a permitted use.
72. See Michael K. Whitman, The Ripeness Doctrine in the Land-Use Context: The
Municipality's Ally and the Landowner's Nemesis, 29 UPB. LAW. 13, 35-39 (1997).
73. See, e.g., Pomponio v. Fanquier County Bd. of Supervisors, 21 F.3d 1319, 1327
(4th Cir. 1994) ("We also have reiterated that state and local zoning and land use law is
particularly the province of the State ....").
74. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
75. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
76. The Supreme Court recently stated: "[O]ur cases have long established that mere
diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking."
Concrete Pipe & Prod., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993)
(citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (involving
approximately 75% dimunition in value) and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,405 (1915)
(involving 92.5% dimunition in value)).
77. See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 405.
78. See. e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 54, at §§ 5.68 to 5.76 (discussing treatment of
non-conforming uses by both courts and government).
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IlI. "TAKINGS REFORM" LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Reasons for Reform Proposals
Property rights "reform" of some sort has been considered in recent years
both in Congress79 and in virtually all of the states.8" In retrospect, this
widespread phenomenon is understandable given a shift in basic cultural values
that began several decades ago as the importance of environmental, aesthetic,
and historical concerns increased in society. Legislators and administrators
responded to this shift by adopting a wide range of new limits on land use in
order to protect the environment, to improve the appearance of communities,
and to preserve historic structures. By and large, the courts have recognized this
consensus and endorsed these limits as proper exercises of the police power.
Not surprisingly, not all segments of society have shared the new
consensus. In particular, real estate developers and certain types of industries
felt the economic impact of the regulations more than most of society. As a
result, they had reason to disagree with the view that it was justifiable to limit
their economic benefit in order to pursue broad public goals, no matter how
laudable those goals might be. Though these corporate interest groups have
79. For discussions of federal statutory proposals, see, for example, Mark W. Cordes,
Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187,
189 (1997); Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiatives As a Response to
"Environmental Takings, "46 S.C. L. REv. 613,630-33 (1995); Frank L Michelman,A Skeptical
View of "Property Rights" Legislation, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 409 (1995); Jerome M. Organ,
Understanding State and Federal Property Rights Legislation, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 191, 211-13
(1995); Joseph L. Sax, Takings Legislation: Where It Stands and What Is Next, 23 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 509 (1996); David A. Thomas, The Illusory Restraints and Empty Promises of New
Property Protection Laws, 28 URB. LAW. 223,254-56 (1996); Michael Allan Wolf, Overtaking
the Fifth Amendment: The Legislative Backlash Against Environmentalism, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 637 (1995).
The federal regulatory programs have also been the subject of an executive order.
Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8,859 (1988). The Order states that takings occur where
regulations "substantially affect" property values. Id. at 8,860-61. The Order also requires
federal agencies to prepare a takings implications assessment that evaluates the takings impacts
of an action. Id. at 8,862. Additionally, the Order requires the Attorney General to issue
guidelines forimplementing the Order entitled Attorney General's Guidelinesfor the Evaluation
of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated Takings (1988). Id. at 8,859. For discussion of the
Order, see, for example, Marzulla, supra at 629-30, where she notes that the Order appears to
have had little effect.
80. For discussion of state statutory proposals, see, for example, Bruce Burton,
Regulatory Takings, Private Property Protection Acts, and the "Moragne Principle:" A
Proposalfor Judicial-Legislative Comity, 49 S.C. L. REV. 83, 119-27 app. B (1997) (containing
an appendix with a tabular review of proposals by state); Cordes, supra note 79, at 190-92;
Marilyn F. Drees, Do State Legislatures Have a Role in Resolving the "Just Compensation"
Dilemma? Some Lessonsfrom Public Choice and Positive Political Theory, 66 FORDHAML.REv.
787 (1997) (containing an appendix summarizing state statutes); Marzulla, supra note 79, at 633-
35; Organ, supra note 79, at 199-211; Thomas, supra note 79, 224-54 (summarizing and
comparing legislation adopted in fourteen states at the time article written); Frank A. Vickory
& Barry A. Diskin, Advances in Private Property Protection Rights: The States in the Vanguard,
34 AM. Bus. L.J. 561 (1997); Thomas G. Douglass, Jr., Note, Have They Gone "Too Far"? An
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played a major role in fighting the increase in regulation, there has also been
a more populist dimension in some states. For example, workers who make
their living in the logging industry have opposed environmental regulation that
would result in a loss of their jobs." As the courts approved increasingly
restrictive land use limitations based on the new goals, these interest groups
had more incentive to challenge the new consensus and to seek a political
solution. Moreover, these interest groups had sufficient resources to make
legislators listen to their views. The net result is that these groups have been
able to push for "reform" in the guise of increased protection of property rights,
at both the national and state levels.82
In addition, these interest groups were able to gain some public support for
their position because the three "facts of life" about regulatory takings provide
a context where reform rhetoric can flourish. As a result, the proponents of this
reform have been able to package their arguments in terms of a "rhetoric of
rights," as opposed to arguments based on mere self interest. More specifically,
it is easy for those who desire change to make three types of argument, each of
which parallels one of the facts of life: 3
(1) Clarity. The right to compensation for a taking is too important to lack
a clear, set formula. A predictable standard for identifying a taking is
needed to guide both citizens and regulators.
(2) Administrative efficiency. It is wasteful and unfair to citizens for
takings decisions to be so unpredictable, expensive, and time
consuming. A simpler, cheaper, and faster system is needed.
(3) Fairness. It is unfair for only a small segment of society to suffer
substantial economic losses because of a regulation designed for the
public good. If land use is limited because of a legitimate public need,
then the public should pay for the economic impact on the owner.
These arguments are often buttressed by more general libertarian and
81. Donald Snow, The Pristine Silence of Leaving it All Alone, in A WOLF IN THE
GARDEN 27,29-30,35 (Philip D. Brick & R. McGreggor Cawley eds., 1996). Other accounts of
populist support of property rights reform have been written. See, e.g., Philip D. Brick & R.
McGreggor Cawley, Epilogue to AWOLF rNTHE GARDEN, supra, at 303 (noting that one populist
objection to environmentalism is that environmentalists are viewed as snobbish "elitists" and
"outsiders"); infra notes 126,128,249 and accompanying text (citing to sources arguing that the
reform movement has been a populist, grass roots development). Accounts of lack of populist
support for property rights reform also exist. See, e.g., Glenn P. Sugameli, Environmentalism:
The Real Movement to Protect Property Rights, in A WOLF IN THE GARDEN, supra, at 62-63
(discussing rejection of takings bills); infra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing public
rejection by referendum of property rights reform); infra note 248 and accompanying text
(discussing public indifference in Texas). For discussion of the role of corporate interests in
providing funding for populist support of reform, see Snow, supra, at 32-33.
82. For further discussion of this push for reform, see Kirk Emerson, Taking the Land
Rights Movement Seriously, in A WOLF IN THE GARDEN, supra note 81, at 115 and infra Part
III.B.2.
83. For examples of persons making one more of these arguments, see JAMES V.
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efficiency positions that favor increased protection of rights.84 The libertarian
perspective is based on a two-part argument: (1) the right to private property
is essential to liberty, particularly where land is involved;8" and (2) this
essential right has been, or will be, seriously eroded if more restrictive limits
on regulatory takings are not adopted.86 Efficiency arguments stress the impact
on competitive markets resulting from a regulatory system that does not respect
reasonable investment decisions and that separates the costs of regulation from
84. For discussion of early works in this vein, see, for example, Harvey M. Jacobs &
Brian W. Ohm, Statutory Takings Legislation: The National Context, the Wisconsin and
Minnesota Proposals, 2 Wis. ENvTL. L.J. 173, 179-85 (1995). Perhaps the most influential book
in the theoretical development of the reformers' position is RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). For discussions of the role of
Epstein's views in the takings reform movement, see CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW:
ARGUINGTHEREAGANREVOLUTION-AFIRSTHANDACCOUNT 183 (1991); Jacobs & Ohm, supra,
at 181; and Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power, Public Value, and Private Right,
26 ENVTL. L. 1, 6-7 (1996). Fried notes:
Attorney General Meese and his young
advisers-many drawn from the ranks of the then
fledgling Federalist Societies and often devotees of
the extreme libertarian views of Chicago law
professor Richard Epstein-had a specific,
aggressive, and, it seemed to me, quite radical project
in mind: to use the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment as a severe brake upon federal and state
regulation of business and property. The grand plan
was to make government pay compensation as for a
taking ofproperty every time its regulations impinged
too severely on a property right-limiting the
possible uses for a parcel of land or restricting or
tying up a business in regulatory red tape. If the
government labored under so severe an obligation,
there would be, to say the least, much less regulation.
FRIED, supra, at 183 (endnote omitted). For criticisms of Epstein's position, see, for example,
Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 24, 47 (1986) (noting
that Epstein's views are "likely to find a wide and receptive audience in today's political
climate," but characterizing Epstein's views as a "travesty of constitutional scholarship" and
"stark nonsense"); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents
in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1667, 1669-70 (1988) (arguing that
Epstein's position rests on "naive conceptualism" and "semantic reductionism"); Joseph L. Sax,
Takings, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 293 (1986) (stating that Epstein "has become the prisoner of
an intellectual style so confining and of a philosophy so rigid that he has disabled himself from
seeing problems as beyond the grasp of mere formalism"). For a more recent example of
Epstein's position and of criticisms of it, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and
Speech: The Legacy ofPruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 22 (1997) (criticizing the
Supreme Court for giving inadequate weight to the right to exclude others from property); Frank
Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for the Lost Commons: A Reply to
Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 57, 59 (1997) (criticizing Epstein's position as contrary
to the "country's actually prevailing, historical understandings and commitments").
85. See, e.g., Paul J. Boudreaux, The Quintessential Best Case for "Takings"
Compensation-A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying the Elements of Land-Use Regulations
That Present the Best Case for Government Compensation, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 193, 214-23
(1997) (giving reasons why real property is different).
86. See, e.g., Loren A. Smith, Life Liberty & Whose Property?: An Essay on Property
Rights, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1996) ("[A] free society cannot exist without the strong
protection of individual property rights and the mechanism for their jealous protection.").
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the benefits. For example, because community members who enjoy the benefits
of open spaces under a restricted-development-zoning scheme do not bear the
costs of the restrictions, it is very likely that the consumption of open spaces
will be higher than it would be in an efficient market scheme where the
community members would have to pay to enjoy the open spaces.
It is important to note that all of these arguments are only arguments, not
inevitable moral conclusions or facts of life. More specifically, these arguments
are subject to counterarguments like the following:
(1) The values of clarity, predictability, and efficiency must be balanced
against concerns like accurate, fair, and just decisionmaking.
Achieving predictability by mechanical, arbitrary, or unfair rules is not
desirable. 7
(2) It is neither fair nor efficient for individuals to seek selfish private gain
at the expense of their neighbors, of the environment, and of our
unique historical treasures. As a matter of history and current practice,
land use has always been subject to police power, which often has the
effect of forcing land owners to address the costs of development
rather than externalize these costs to society. Thus, owners have
neither a "right" nor a "reasonable expectation" to use their property
as they wish. 8
(3) Liberty is not dependent upon the constitutional requirement of
compensation; the European democracies function quite well without
a "takings clause."' 9 Moreover, property rights are a social construct
subject to a wide range of theoretical interpretations; no single view
of the proper amount of protection is necessarily right or just.90
(4) Regulatory schemes often create property value because each owner
has both reciprocal burdens and benefits as a result of the scheme.9'
87. See, e.g., Michelman,supra note 79, at 420-21 (suggesting that the results of such
rules would be unacceptable to the American people).
88. See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 79, at 230-34 (examining nature of property
interests); John A. Humbach, Should Taxpayers Pay People to Obey Environmental Laws?, 6
FORDHAM ENvTL. L. J. 423, 431-32 (1995) (arguing that environmental policy considerations
should prevent land owners from having such absolute rights); Carol M. Rose, A Dozen
Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 265, 267 (1996) (discussing how the "new takings measures" seek to upset the
traditional balance between private and public property rights).
89. See, e.g., Juergensmeyer, supra note 9, at 701 (noting that takings legislation "is
almost exclusively an [American] obsession").
90. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law?: Libertarian
Property, Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENvrL. L.
171 (1995) (discussing various cases that have led to "a judicial property rights revolution");
Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory
of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 297, 361-63 (1990) ("Our very notion of private
property depends upon societal recognition of the concept because society protects the interests
of the owner."); Cordes, supra note 79, at 230 ("[Property is a social construct whereby society
in essence recognizes and maintains property rights.").
91. See, e.g., Coletta, supra note 90, at 363 -64 (endorsing reciprocity analysis as basis
of new approach to regulatory takings); Cordes, supra note 79, at 234-38 (discussing several
ways governmental restrictions can increase property value); FiSCHEL, supra note 10, at 81
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For example, an owner of commercially zoned property benefits from
zoning in general and from the effect on the value of his land that
flows from the limitations on those parcels of land that can be used for
commercial purposes.92
Of course, these counterarguments are also only arguments. The point is not
that one side is right and the other is wrong. Instead, the point is that the
identification of when a person has a right to compensation involves choices
about values and conceptions ofjustices.
Four things are clear concerning these choices. First, they have tremendous
economic and symbolic importance. Determining when compensation for a
regulatory taking is required tells us a lot about ourselves as a society. In
particular, it tells us about the distribution of wealth and responsibility.93
Expanding requirements for compensation increases the wealth of property
owners at the expense of society and frees owners from social responsibility in
the use of their property. Decreasing requirements for compensation has
opposite results. Second, it is clear that substantial disagreement about social
values and property rights abounds. Third, in a democratic society, one proper
forum for resolving such basic disputes is the legislature.94 Fourth, when this
disagreement occurs within the legislative context, "horror stories" and sound
bites can overwhelm the subtleties and complexities of the opposing arguments.
In the political arena, the arguments can become reduced to rhetorical phrases
like "rights need more protection" or "ownership involves responsibility."95
(discussing how such an increase in value can result in a "benefit-offset"). The reciprocal
relationship between benefits and burdens has been a recurring theme in Supreme Court
treatment of takings claims. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470,491 (1987) (citing Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 144-50
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("While each of us is burdened somewhatby such restrictions
[on the use of property], we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on
others.")); Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255,262 (1980) (An owner claiming that a taking
had resulted from regulation at issue "will share with other owners the benefits and burdens of
the city's exercise of its police power. In assessing the fairness of the zoning ordinances, these
benefits must be considered along with any dimunition in market value that the appellants might
suffer."); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 133 (recognizing appellants' concern for "fair and
equitable distribution of benefits and burdens of governmental action"); Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("[A]verage reciprocity of advantage . . .has been
recognized as ajustification of various laws."). The cases have not required that benefits equal
burdens. Instead, they view the existence of some benefit as one factor among many that is
relevant to whether a taking has occurred.
92. See infra text accompanying note 302.
93. See, e.g., Torres, supra note 84, at 3 ("[A]ny regulation that rearranges the
distribution of rights and liabilities can be understood as a redistribution of wealth.").
94. Because the proponents of property rights reform have sought legislative action,
it would seem that they agree with this view. Logically, opponents of reform would appear to
be committed to it as well because opponents rely on the police power to justify'legislatively
adopted land use schemes. The text above uses the phrase "one proper forum" in recognition of
the fact that the courts obviously have a role in resolving this dispute through the interpretation
and application of the Takings Clause.
95. For analyses of use of rhetorical positions in support of property rights reform,
see, for example, Jon Christensen, War of Words, in A WOLF IN THE GARDEN, supra note 81, at
151; Jonathan I. Lange, The Logic of Competing Information Campaigns: Conflict over Old
1998]
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Such rhetoric clouds analysis at best and replaces analysis at worst.
B. Variations Among the States
1. Types of Reform Proposals
Three iypes of reforms of takings law have been proposed. The first type
requires that regulators assess the impact of new rules on property owners
before imposing the rules. The second type of reform consists of new
procedural devices that are designed to simplify the process of determining
whether a taking has occurred. The third type of reform consists of substantive
changes that make it easier to identify a taking and that, as a general rule,
provide greater protection to property owners than that provided by current
constitutional doctrines.
In considering the various schemes that have been considered by the states,
it is important to note that all of them exclude federal regulatory schemes. Such
an exclusion is obviously necessary; no state can require the federal
government to follow procedural rules or to compensate under a state's takings
statute. Nevertheless, this obvious exclusion is important because federal
environmental and wildlife protection schemes are frequently the catalysts of
calls for reform. As a result, reform effort is often directed at the adoption of
a state statute which may have no effect on the regulatory scheme that
motivated the desire for reform.96 As indicated below,97 this type of disjunction
between concerns and goals vis-a-vis particular legislation is a recurring theme
in property rights reform.
a. Assessment Schemes
Assessment statutes require regulators to assess the potential takings
impact of restrictions on land use. By executive order, the federal government
has such a scheme,9" and over a dozen states have adopted statutory assessment
schemes.99 Generally, these schemes simply adopt current constitutional
doctrine concerning what constitutes a taking.' 0 It is hard to generalize further
because assessment requirements vary considerably from state to state in the
following ways: (1) how the assessment is done, (2) which governmental
entities must do it, (3) which types of decisions are affected, and (4) whether
the process is subject to some sort ofjudicial review.'
There appear to be no published studies of how these statutes have been
Growth and the Spotted Owl, in A WOLF IN THE GARDEN, supra note 81, at 135.
96. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 79 (providing examples of this tendency).
97. See infra notes 129, 210, 238-41 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 79 (discussing Exec. Order No. 12,630 and its mandates).
99. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 80, at 119-27 (providing a chart of regulatory
schemes considered in 43 states); Cordes, supra note 79, at 204 ("[A]t least fifteen states have
enacted some type of assessment statute and assessment legislation has been introduced in
numerous other states .... ) (footnote omitted).
100. Cordes, supra note 79, at 204.
101. Id. at 205-12.
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implemented or of whether they have had any effect on the regulatory process.
Nevertheless, it is likely they have little effect. An initial problem is that.no
simple, easily applied test for identifying a taking exists. 2 Given this lack of
a test, how is the assessment to be done in a meaningful manner? Another
problem is that if regulators are merely told to consider the possibility of
constitutional takings, the assessment requirement is unnecessary. Rational
regulators already consider the possibility of takings; irrational regulators will
not become rational by legislative fiat. If the legislature requires not only
consideration but also extensive findings and reports, one of the following two
results is likely: either a superficial approach will be used or regulation will be
reduced. Given their limited personnel and budgets, regulators will not have a
third choice." 3 Moreover, given the likely commitment by the regulators to the
goals of reform, the regulators presumably will choose the option of superficial
compliance. Thus, it is not surprising that one commentator has concluded that
"the overall value of assessment requirements is highly questionable."'" This
conclusion also seems applicable to the federal scheme because it appears that
the federal assessment requirement has had little, if any, impact on the
regulatory process."0 5 However, some commentators think that a carefully
drawn assessment scheme can provide a useful tool for protecting rights and
preventing costlypayouts for compensationunder the constitutional standard."0 6
In all likelihood, this limited effectiveness is one reason for the relative
popularity of assessment schemes. To the extent that it appears that an
assessment scheme can be satisfied by relatively simple, pro forma measures,
opponents of property rights reform are going to be less concerned about this
type of scheme. Consequently, adopting an assessment scheme can provide an
approach that enables reformers to claim victory while regulators are able to
proceed with business as usual. Such compromise and symbolic victories can
be an important part of the legislative process. However, the nature of such
legislation must be understood.
b. Process Statutes
Several states have adopted schemes designed to simplify and expedite the
process of takings challenges.0 7 Though these schemes vary enormously, most
are designed to give an alternative to judicial review by providing
administrative resolution of a takings claim or mediation. In addition, at least
one scheme provides that a land use decision is ripe for judicial review within
102. See supra notes 7-67 and accompanying text.
103. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
104. Cordes, supra note 79, at 225.
105. See Marzulla, supra note 79, at 629-30.
106. See, e.g., John Martinez, Statutes Enacting Takings Law: Flying in the Face of
Uncertainty, 26 URB. LAw. 327,343-44 (1994) (providing a positive review of the Washington
scheme, which requires the state attorney general to promulgate a process and guidelines for
assessment review).
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180 days of the owner's challenge on a statutory takings ground.'
These process reform schemes are so few, so diverse, and so new that it is
not possible to reach conclusions about their effect. Clear, short ripeness
periods maybe beneficial because existing ripeness rules can have harsh effects
on owners.'0 9 However, whatever salutory effect those process changes have
will likely be limited for two reasons. First, the regulatory process, particularly
in zoning, already has numerous procedural rights for property owners. The
incremental effect of one more procedural right is likely to be minimal. Second,
property owners may conclude that a clearer, shortened ripeness approach has
only limited value in seeking compensation for a taking, given that the
substantive rules will still be subject to the facts of life about takings."' As a
result, there will still be no set formula, the regulation will still be presumed
valid, the process will still be lengthy and expensive (though perhaps a little
less so in some cases), and it will still be possible to suffer a substantial
economic loss without having a right to compensation.
c. New Standards for Compensation
A number of states have adopted statutes that establish a new, statutory
right to compensation based upon. a standard that is different from the
constitutional test for a taking."' These statutes vary considerably in terms of
their standards for mandating compensation. Several statutes defie the right
in terms of a loss in value above a certain percentage." 2 The Mississippi and
Louisiana statutes apply only to agricultural and forest uses and require
compensation for a loss in value of forty percent or more (Mississippi),' or
twenty percent or more (Louisiana).'" Texas has a broader, though still
somewhat limited," 5 scheme requiring compensation for governmental action
that reduces the value of property by twenty-five percent or more." 6 The
Florida statute appears to require compensation for any government action that
108. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(5)(a) (West Supp. 1998).
109. For discussion of the "ripeness" requirement as a barrier to judicial review, see
supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
110. See supra Part II.B.
111. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 80, at 119-27 (providing chart of various state
standards); Cordes, supra note 79, at 225-41 (discussing percentage-based compensation
statutes); Drees, supra note 80, at 836-41 (discussing various state compensation and remedial
process schemes).
112. See Cordes, supra note 79, at 214-18, 225-41. North Carolina has an extremely
limited scheme that permits "takings" type claims for interference with certain rights in
navigable waters. See Cordes, supra, at 214 n.164; Organ, supra note 79, at 203.
113. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-7 to -9 (Supp. 1998).
114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3601-02 (West 1987).
115. For example, cities are exempted. See TEX. GOV'TCoDEANN. § 2007.003(b)(1)
(West Supp. 1998).
116. See id. at § 2007.002(5)(B). For a general discussion of the Texas scheme, see
George E. Grimes, Jr., Comment, Texas Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act: A
Political Solution to the Regulatory Takings Problem, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 557 (1996).
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results in a loss of property value."7
Though all these statutes have a list of exceptions, the list varies from state
to state."8 To the extent that the statutes agree, they include the following
exceptions: (1) activities that threaten harm to public health and safety;" 9
117. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 70.001(2), (3)(b)-(g) (West Supp. 1998). The South
Carolina House of Representatives adopted a bill that was extremely similar to the Florida
statute. For detailed discussion of the language in the South Carolina bill, see infra notes 170-73
and accompanying text. The Florida act contains language suggesting that no compensation is
required unless the burden imposed on the owner by the regulating limitation is "inordinate" or
"unfair." See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 70.001(2), (3)(e) (West Supp. 1998). However, the definitions
accompanying the act indicate: (1) that an owner is entitled to compensation if the owner is
"unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the existing use of the real
property," id. § 70.001 (3)(e); and (2) that "existing" use includes not only "actual, present use"
but also "reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses which are suitable for the subject real
property and compatible with adjacent land uses and which have created an existing fair market
value in the property greater than the fair market value of the actual, present use or activity on
the real property." Id. § 70.001(3)(b). Thus, unless the terms "reasonably foreseeable,
nonspeculative land uses" and "compatible with adjacentland uses" are construed verynarrowly,
owners are entitled to compensation for any reduction in the "fair market value" of the property.
For an argument that this entitlement was the goal of the act, see David L. Powell et al., A
Measured Step to Protect Private Property Rights, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 255, 266-68 (1995)
(The three authors were involved in drafting the act.). For criticism of the statute's definition of
"existing use" as development-biased "doublespeak," see Roy Hunt, Property Rights and
Wrongs: Historic Preservation and Florida's 1995 Private Property Rights Protection Act, 48
FLA. L. REV. 709, 717 (1996).
The inclusion of the phrase "reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses" in the
definition of"existing use" was accomplished by the adding of an amendment to this complex
legislative compromise by a development-oriented lobbyistjust before the legislature voted on
the bill. See David Spohr, Note, Florida's Takings Law: A Bark Worse Than Its Bite, 16 VA.
ENVM.L.J. 313,328 (1997) (citing Elizabeth Willson, Property Act Fences Out the Government,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 5, 1995, at 1B).
For further discussion of the Florida act, see, for example, Robert P. Butts, Private
Property Rights in Florida: Is Legislation the Best Alternative?, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
247 (1997); Jane Cameron Hayman & Nancy Stuparich, Private Property Rights: Regulating
the Regulators, 70 FLA. B.J. 55, Jan. 1996, at 55, 89 (critical review of the Harris Act by authors
who worked for Florida League of Cities, Inc.); Hunt, supra (critical review); Patrick W. Maraist,
A Statutory Beacon in the Land Use Ripeness Maze: The Florida Private Property Rights
Protection Act, 47 FLA.L.REv. 411 (1995) (focusing on and praising changes in ripeness rules);
Powell, supra (praise of act by authors involved in drafting act); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas,
Florida's Property Rights Act: A Political Quick Fix Results in a Mixed Bag of Tricks, 23 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 315 (1995) (generally positive assessment ofthe act combined with criticisms and
proposals for improvement); Michael Murphy, Note, Property Rights and Growth Management
in Florida: Balancing Opportunity andResponsibility in a ChangingPolitical Climate, 14 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 269 (1996) (predicting that the act will "frustrate Florida's efforts to achieve its
growth management goals"); Spohr, supra (examining the act's impact on "Florida's unique
natural environment").
118. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3)(e) (West Supp. 1998) (limiting the term
"inordinate burden"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3602(12) (West 1987) (noting that the term
"inverse condemnation" does not include certain actions, such as actions resulting from police
power or from an order resulting from a violation of state law); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-7(e)
(Supp. 1998) (limiting the definition of "inverse condemnation"); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 2007.003(b) (West Supp. 1998) (listing governmental actions to which the chapter does not
apply).
119. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3602(12)(h) (West 1987) ("[A]ctivities that
are harmful to the public and health."); MISS.CODE ANN. § 49-33-7(e)(ii) (Supp. 1998) (activities
noxious and harmful to the public and health); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007.003(b)(7) (West
1998]
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(2) noxious activities constituting public nuisances at common law;120 and
(3) violations of state law.'2'
It is too soon to assess the effects of these substantive compensation
statutes. The use of a reduction in market value as a standard for determining
when compensation is due certainly addresses the three basic facts of life about
the constitutional doctrine of regulatory takings.22 More specifically, these
market value standards provide a set formula for identifying a taking, are less
expensive and time-consuming in application than the constitutional standard,
and provide compensation for substantial reductions in economic value.
However, it is not clear what these compensation schemes will entail in terms
of administrative costs,' 23 compensation payouts, and the costs of regulations
not adopted. Not surprisingly, supporters of reform claim that these schemes
provide increased fairness and justice with no substantial costs to the public
good, 24 while opponents argue that the schemes involve considerable costs,
particularly as a result of regulators being "chilled" from adopting fair and
necessary limitations upon land use.
25
Supp. 1998) ("[Ain action taken out of a reasonable faith belief that ... [it] is necessary to
prevent a grave and immediate threat to life or property.").
120. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3)(e) (West Supp. 1998) (exempting public
nuisance or noxious use); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-7(e)(ii) (Supp. 1998) (exempting public
nuisance); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007.003(b)(6) (West Supp. 1998) (exempting public or
private nuisance).
121. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3602(12)(e) (West 1987) ("An order issued
as a result of a violation of law."); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-7(e)(iii) (Supp. 1998) (order
resulting from violation of law); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007.003(b)(3) (West Supp. 1998)
("[A] lawful seizure of property as evidence of a crime or violation of law.").
122. See supra Part II.B.
123. The reduction in costs for an individual challenge in a particular case could raise
the overall administrative costs for regulations because the lower costs to each challenger might
result in an overall increase in takings claims.
124. See, e.g., Subcommittee on the Constitution: Hearing on "State Approaches to
Protecting Private Property Rights, " 112th Legis., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997) (testimony of Dean
Saunders, formermember, Fla. House ofRep.) (stating that only 12 cases have been filed); Letter
from Sen. Charlie Bronson, Florida Senate, to Rep. James H. Harrison, Chairman, South Carolina
House of Representatives Judiciary Committee (May 13, 1997) (on file with author) (stating that
only 12 claims had been filed under Florida act).
125. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 117, at 718-19 (listing examples of "chilled"
regulation to protect the environment and to protect historic areas and buildings as a result of the
Florida act). In the context of the South Carolina debate, the South Carolina Coastal
Conservation League alleged:
In Florida, a virtually identical law took effect in
October 1995. Since then, Florida's state and local
officials have had to contend with a new "inordinate
burden" claim nearly every two weeks. In West Palm
Beach, for example, citizens voted to limit the height
of new buildings on the waterfront to five stories. The
city has since received over $25 million in
"inordinate burden" claims from waterfront property
owners. Furthermore, the mere threat of such claims
has prevented Florida's state and local governments
from enacting reasonable laws that have broad public
support. In Palm Beach County, for example, officials
abandoned a draft growth management ordinance
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It is not easy to assess these arguments. Both sides are biased, and proving
or disproving whether these compensation schemes "chilled" regulators is
extremely difficult. Nevertheless, it seems some tension exists between two
propositions in the proponents' arguments. The first proposition is that
substantive changes are needed because: (1) regulatory limits are imposed in
a significant number of instances with no requirement of compensation under
the constitutional standard; and (2) it is unfair to adopt these restrictions unless
owners are compensated. The second proposition is that the substantive
changes requiring compensation where it is not constitutionally mandated will
not impose significant costs-either in the form of compensatory payouts or of
regulations not adopted. It is somewhat counterintuitive to think that both
propositions are true. In other words, it seems logical to assume that substantive
changes involve substantial costs, even though such costs cannot be precisely
calculated.
2. The Meaning of a "National Reform Movement"
Because the approach to reform has been fundamentally different from
state to state, it is appropriate to ask what it means to speak in terms of a
"national movement." Insofar as property rights reform is involved, a national
movement cannot mean that there is a coherent scheme of common legislative
proposals or enactments. Instead, the movement is characterized by a wide
variety of proposals, ranging from "window dressing," in the form of mild
assessment requirements, to radical substantive reform like that adopted in
Florida. Moreover, the legislative treatment of the proposals varies widely.
Some states have not adopted any reform legislation, and where legislation has
been adopted, the content varies from state to state. The response of voters has
also been diverse. For example, opponents of reform agreed to the Florida
scheme partly out of concern that the voters might approve a more draconian
amendment to the state constitution. 126 In contrast, voters in Arizona and
because their attorney predicted that it would give
rise to "inordinate burden" claims. In Saratoga
County, officials were unable to enact a complete ban
on nudity in businesses because the owner of one
night club threatened to sue, claiming an "inordinate
burden."
The New Property Rights Bill: Wolf in Sheep's Clothing (S.C. Coastal Conservation League,
Beaufort, S.C.), Apr. 21, 1995 at I. Some supporters recognize that some degree of chilling has
occurred but regard this chilling as "proper." See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Charles W. Sembler, II,
Florida House of Representatives, to Rep. James H. Harrison, Chairman, South Carolina House
of Representatives Judiciary Committee (May 14, 1997) (on file with author) ("[R]egulators are
far more careful and discriminating... [and] more willing to listen to landowners' concerns and
look for consensus .... [The Harris Act] has created a new sense of caution among regulatory
agencies during a period of fiscal restraint.").
126. See, e.g., Juergensmeyer, supra note 9, at 699 (stating that Florida act "was the
product of a carefully crafted compromise" that "staved off the [possibly successful] attempts
of property rights protection forces to amend the Florida Constitution"); Powell, supra note 117,
at 261-64 (noting that "a citizens group mounted a well-funded petition drive" for constitutional
amendments concerning private property rights); Vargas, supra note 117, at 327-33 (noting
support for reform both from "big business" interests and from a more populist group of small
1998]
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Washington voted in referenda to reject a previously enacted compensation
scheme.27
Thus, the property rights movement is a national movement, but only in
terms of four elements.'28 First, a segment of society in each state would prefer
less regulation of land use. This segment agrees on the goal of less regulation,
but it has not developed a coherent scheme identifying specific problems and
providing explicitly designed solutions to these problems.'29 Second, this
segment of society has sufficient resources to place the issue of compensation
for regulatory impact on land value on the political agenda in each state and in
Congress, and it has the ability to coordinate these efforts by exchanging data
and legislative proposals. Third, this push for reform gained some measure of
public support by phrasing its position in terms of a rhetoric of rights, 30 which
stresses the importance of rights without recognizing the difficult tasks of
defining rights and of justifying that definition.' This rhetoric is bolstered by
constant repetition of "horror stories" about governmental waste and abuse.'32
Fourth, this reform effort is coordinated at a national level by conservative,
business-oriented groups like the American Legislative Exchange Council, the
American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Association of Realtors, and
Defenders of Property Rights.'
33
It is important to keep this sense of the term "national movement" in mind
when considering property rights reform proposals because the term connotes
abroader, more politically persuasive meaning. More specifically, reference to
a national movement in a state legislative debate suggests a coherent scheme
of reform is being pushed throughout the country. The phrase also suggests that
other parts of the country have not only considered the matter but also
recognized a need for reform and agreed on the context of reform. These
connotations give the phrase "a national movement" far more rhetorical impact
than the more accurate statement that there is a national push, phrased in terms
farmers, middle class landowners, and developers).
127. See Cordes, supra note 79, at 191 & n.24; Drees, supra note 80, at 806-07.
128. For an argument that the proper rights reform movement has been a more
populist, grass roots development than argued in this Article, see Nancie G. Marzulla, The
Property Rights Movement: How It Began and Where It Is Headed, in LAND RIGHTS: THE
1990s' PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION I (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995).
129. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 79, at 640-50 (illustrating ways that problems
identified by reformers are not addressed by property rights legislation).
130. See supra notes 82, 95 and accompanying text; Wolf, supra note 79.
131. See supra notes 26-67, 87-92 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Torres, supra note 84, at 8 (stating that the struggle over regulatory
takings has been told "in terms of a generalized government attack on private property");
William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, The Narratives of Takings, and
Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 1151, 1158 (1997) ("The property rights
movement derives its political strength from the power of its stories."); Wolf, supra note 79, at
639 (relating stories about "citizens whose property is severely devalued or appropriated").
133. David Helvarg, LegalAssault on the Environment, THENATION, Jan. 30, 1995,
at 126; Marianne Lavelle, The "Property Rights" Revolt, NAT'LL.J., May 10, 1993, at 1. The
American Legislative Exchange Council is "a D.C.-based organization of state legislators who
call themselves pro-business, pro-free enterprise and claim 2,400 members." Id. at 34.
Defenders of Property Rights claims to be "the nation's only legal defense foundation devoted
exclusively to the protection of private property rights." Marzulla, supra note 79, at 613 n.*.
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of rights rhetoric and horror stories, for reduced regulation of land use by a
segment of society that would prefer less regulation and has the resources to
place the issue on the political agenda.
When one views the property rights movement in this manner, the diversity
of action in the various states makes sense. The legislation (or lack of
legislation) resulting from property rights "reform" can only be understood as
each state's individualized response to the push for change. From this
perspective, it becomes important to consider the individual legal and political
characteristics that determine how each state will respond to a well-funded
push for legislative change in the approach to compensation for the economic
impact of land use regulation. The following section of this Article addresses
this question within the context of the South Carolina experience with property
rights reform.
IV. "TAKINGS REFORM" IN SOUTH CAROLINA
The takings reform movement arrived in the South Carolina legislature in
1995, when several takings bills were introduced in the House and Senate.13
No bill was passed during the 1995-96 session, but takings bills were
introduced in both houses during the 1997-98 session. 35 The House passed a
takings bill on May 28, 1997. This bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, which referred it to a special subcommittee in 1998. However, no
bill was reported out of the subcommittee before the legislature adjourned in
1998. Though no property rights legislation has yet been adopted, it seems
likely that new legislative proposals will be made during the 1999-2000
session.116 The takings reform proposals considered by the South Carolina
legislature include all three types of reform: assessment requirements,
procedural reform, and substantive changes. All of these proposals encountered
substantial opposition, particularly from local governments and
environmentalists.
A. The Proposals
1. 1995-96 Legislative Session
Four bills were introduced during the 1995-96 legislative session. One of
these bills was an assessment-type act that imposed substantial procedural
burdens on state agencies."' Though parts of this bill appeared in later
134. See infra Part IV.A.1.
135. See infra Part IV.A.l.a.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 242-43.
137. S. 374, 11 1th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1995). The bill required state agencies to
adopt assessment guidelines, to consider an explicit list of factors concerning actions with
"constitutional taking implications," and to submit copies of assessments to the State Budget and
Control Board. Id. §§ 28-13-30, -40(A)(2), -40(D). Though the bill focuses on assessment, the
bill arguably imposed a more restrictive substantive standard on exactments than the
constitutional standard. Exactments are conditions imposed on an owner as a condition for
granting apermit. Seesupra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. Subsection 28-13-40(B)(1) of
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proposals, 3 ' the bill received relatively little attention. Instead, legislative
discussion and political debate focused on two bills that expanded the
substantive rights of property owners andprovided a simplified judicial process
to enforce property owners' rights.
The first of these bills, South Carolina Senate Bill 121,139 provided that
"[whenever] any regulatory program or law operates to reduce the fair market
value of real property to less than fifty percent of its fair market value.., the
property is deemed to have been taken."'40 In such a case, the owner was
entitled "to require condemnation by and just compensation from the
governmental unit, or units . . . involved . . . [and] to have the just
compensation determined by ajury... for the full value of the interest taken or
for the full amount of the decrease in fair market value.""'' The bill provided
exceptions to the right of compensation if the regulation was "to prevent uses
noxious in fact, or to prevent demonstrable harm, to the health and safety of the
public.' 142 The bill also provided:
If the governmental unit which is found to have inversely
condemned the property is unwilling or unable to pay the
costs awarded, it may instead relax the land use planning,
zoning, or other regulatory program as it affects the plaintiff's
land and all similarly situated land in the jurisdiction in which
the regulatory program is in effect, to the level of regulation
in place as of the time the owner acquired title or January 1,
1996, whichever is later.
4
1
The second legislative proposal that received attention appeared in two
identical bills, South Carolina House Bill 3790' 4 and South Carolina Senate
Bill 839.41 These bills imposed substantial assessmentrequirements, 346 granted
a new right of compensation for regulations resulting in a "substantial
diminution of the total value of the real property,"'47 and provided that the
state's Eminent Domain Procedure Act 48 would be used to determine takings
the bill provides: "If an agency requires a person to obtain a permit for a specific use of private
property, any conditions imposed on issuing the permit shall directly relate to the purpose for
which the permit is issued and shall substantially advance thatpurpose." (emphasis added). The
constitutional standard for exactments does not require direct relationship and substantial
advancement. Instead, the Supreme Court has imposed a looser standard of "rough
proportionality." See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
138. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
139. S. 121, 111th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1995).
140. Id. § 2(A).
141. Id. § 2(B)-(C).
142. Id. § 3.
143. Id. § 5(A); see also § 5(C) (dispensing with need for "public hearing or
proceedings" in order to "relax" restrictions).
144. H.R. 3790, 111 th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1995).
145. S. 839, 111th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1995).
146. See, e.g., S.C. H.R. 3790, § 28-4-50(A) (requiring five separate findings to be
included within written assessment).
147. Id. § 28-4-80.
148. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-10 to -510 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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claims under the state constitution or the federal constitution and under the new
statutory right.'49
2. 1997-98 Legislative Session
The legislative debate during the 1997-98 session focused on South
Carolina House Bill 3591, which was introduced in March 1997. In April 1997
the House Judiciary Committee "amended" South Carolina House Bill 3591 by
substituting a completely different bill. The House adopted this amended bill
in May 1997. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish the original version of South
Carolina House Bill 3591 from the version of South Carolina House Bill 3591
adopted by the House in 1997.
a. South Carolina House Bill 3591 as Originally Introduced
The original version of South Carolina House Bill 3591 50 did not change
the constitutional definition of a taking. Instead, it addressed two concerns.
First, it established an assessment process pursuant to guidelines to be set by
the attorney general.' The factors to be considered were very similar to those
contained in South Carolina Senate Bill 374, which had been introduced in the
1995-96 session."2 This assessment procedure had the potential for imposing
substantial administrative burdens on governmental entities because it required
government entities to "prepare a written assessment which specifically and
fully addresses each of the checklist guidelines" before adopting or enforcing
any proposed land use regulation. 3
Second, the bill attempted to expedite the resolution of takings disputes in
several ways. The bill addressed problems of cost and delay in reaching a final
appealable decision'54 by setting an extremely short time period for determining
ripeness for judicial review. More specifically, the bill provided that:
(1) the owner must exhaust "all administrative remedies afforded by the
applicable governmental entity;"'
55
(2) "the parties shall mediate the dispute;
' I-s6
(3) both the exhaustion of remedies and mediation must "be completed
within one hundred eighty days;"'57 and
(4) "[i]f the matter is not resolved within the one hundred eighty-day
149. See S.C. H.R. 3790, § 28-4-100.
150. H.R. 3591, 112th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997) (as introduced Mar. 4, 1997) (see
infra Appendix).
151. Id. §§ 28-4-40,-60.
152. See id. § 28-4-40(D); S. 374, 11 1th Leg., 1st Sess., § 28-13-40(A) (S.C. 1995).
153. S.C. H.R. 3591, § 28-4-60(A) (as introduced Mar. 4,1997) (see infra Appendix).
This assessment was also declared to be "public information" that "must be made available...
upon request." Id. § 28-4-60(B).
154. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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period, the private property owner may commence a suit for
compensation."'' 8
The bill attempted to provide flexibility in resolving disputes by listing a
number of approaches that a governmental entity was "specifically authorized
and empowered to recommend.. . , consistent with applicable law[,] that
protect the public interest served by the governmental action at issue" in order
to "avoid or resolve a dispute."' 59 The bill also provided that an owner who
prevailed in a suit for compensation for a taking was entitled to "reasonable and
necessary attorney's fees, expert witness fees, court costs, and prejudgment
interest.'
161
An identical bill, South Carolina Senate Bill 686, was introduced in the
Senate on April 23, 1997.161 This bill was not a typical "companion bill"
because it was introduced after the House Judiciary subcommittee amended
South Carolina House Bill 3591 by substituting the bill with provisions from
the Florida takings act. 162 Because the House adopted the revised version of
South Carolina House Bill 3591, the Senate Judiciary Committee's
consideration of proposed takings reform focused on the amended South
Carolina House Bill 3591-not on South Carolina Senate Bill 686.
158. Id. As with H.R. 3790, 11 th Leg., Ist Sess. (S.C. 1995), which was introduced
during the 1995-96 session, the suit would be treated as one for eminent domain condemnation.
See S.C. H.R. 3591, §§ 28-4-30(A), -100(A) (as introduced Mar. 4, 1997) (see infra Appendix).
159. S.C. H.R. 3591, § 28-4-80(A) (as introduced Mar. 4,1997) (see infra Appendix).
The alternatives included, but were not limited to, the following:
(1) [A]n adjustment of land development or permit
standards or other provisions controlling the
development or use of land;
(2) increases or modifications in the density,
intensity, or use of areas of development;
(3) the transfer of development rights;
(4) land swaps or exchanges;
(5) mitigation, including payments in lieu of onsite
mitigation;
(6) location on the least sensitive portion of the
property;
(7) conditioning the amount of development or use
permitted;
(8) a requirement that issues be addressed on a more
comprehensive basis than a single proposed use or
development;
(9) issuance of a variance, special exception, or other
extraordinary relief, including withdrawal of the
proposed action;
(10) purchases of the real property, or an interest in it,
by an appropriate governmental entity.
Id.
160. Id. § 28-4-110(E).
161. S. 686, 112th Leg., lst Sess. (S.C. 1997).
162. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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b. South CarolinaHouseBill 3591 as Amended andAdoptedBy
the House
The version of South Carolina House Bill 3591 passed by the House 6 ' was
virtually identical to the property rights bill adopted in Florida in 1995. 64 This
version adopted a new right to compensation that went far beyond the
constitutional right for regulatory taking. 165 The bill conditioned this right on
the owner's having first sought to resolve the matter by filing an administrative
claim.166 In addition, the bill authorized the governmental entity to resolve this
claim through a variety of measures,
167 and provided that the claim was "ripe")
for judicial review within no more than 180 days from the filing of the
administrative claim.168 Ifjudicial action is involved, the bill entitled the winner
to costs and reasonable attorney fees under certain conditions. 69
The amended bill granted an extraordinarily broad, substantive right to
compensation. The bill provided:
When a specific action of a governmental entity has
inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a
vested right to a specific use of real property, the property
owner of that real property is entitled to relief, which may
include compensation for the actual loss to the fair market
value of the real property caused by the action of'government,
as provided in this section.
17
The definitions portion of the bill provides useful guidance on the meaning of
this right. The term "inordinately burdened" is defined as:
[A]n action of one or more governmental entities [that] has
directly restricted or limited the use of real property such that
the property owner is unable to attain the reasonable,
investment-backed expectation for the existing use of the real
property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property
with the respect to the real property as a whole, or that the
property owner is left with existing or vested use[s] that are
unreasonable such that the property owner bears a
163. H.R. 3591, 112th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997) (as adopted by the House on
May 28, 1997).
164. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text (discussing Florida bill).
165. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
166. S.C. H.R. 3591, § 28-4-40(A) (as adopted by the House on May 28, 1997).
167. Id. § 28-4-40(C); see also id. § 284-40(D) (mandating protection of public
interest in administrative settlement context). The listing of remedial measures was virtually
identical to that contained in § 28-4-80(A) of the original version of South Carolina House Bill
3591. See H.R. 3591, 112th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997) (as introduced Mar. 4, 1997) (see infra
Appendix).
168. S.C. H.R. 3591, § 28-4-50 (as adopted by House on May 28, 1997).
169. Id. § 28-4-60(A), (C).
170. Id. § 28-4-30(A); see supra note 117 and accompanying text for analysis of the
same provisions in context of discussion of the Florida act.
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disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of




This definition was expanded by defining "existing use" broadly as follows:
The term "existing use" means an actual present use or
activity on the real property including periods of inactivity
which are normally associated with, or are incidental to, the
nature or type of use or activity or such reasonably
foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses which are suitable for
the subject real property and compatible with adjacent land
uses and which have created an existing fair market value in
the property greater than the fair market value of the actual
present use or activity on the real property.'
The net result of these statutory provisions is that, unless one of the specifically
identified exceptions applies," an owner is entitled to compensation if
governmental action reduces the market value of the property.
3. The Diversity of the Proposals
The diversity of the proposals raises questions about the goals of reformers.
More specifically, it is not clear whether this diversity might be explained by
one or more of the following views:
(1) The proponents of reform were not in agreement about the goals of
171. S.C. H.R. 3591, § 28-4-30(B)(5) (as adopted by the House on May 28, 1997).
The bracketed "s" is included to reflect the plural of "use" contained in the parallel provision of
the Florida act. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3)(e) (West Supp. 1998). The South Carolina bill
uses the term "use" which results in the bill's being grammatically incorrect.
172. S.C. H.R. 3591, § 28-4-30(B)(2) (as adopted by the House on May 28, 1997);
see supra note 117 for discussion of Florida's adoption of this expanded definition.
173. See S.C. H.R. 3591, § 28-4-30(B)(5) (as adopted by the House on May 28,
1997). The subsection contains the following list of exclusions:
The terms 'inordinate burden' or 'inordinately
burdened' do not include temporary impacts to real
property; impacts to real property occasioned by
governmental abatement, prohibition, prevention, or
remediation of a public nuisance at common law or a
noxious use of private property; impacts to real
property caused by an action ofa governmental entity
taken to grant relief to a property owner under this
section; or any action of a governmental entity
affecting either the location of any type of solid or
liquid waste disposal facility (or the discharge
therefrom) or landfill or expansion of any existing
solid or liquid waste disposal facility (or the
discharge therefrom) or landfill.
[Vol. 50:93
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reform. For example, they disagreed about the current state of the law
or its "bad effects."
(2) The proponents of reform agreed on goals but were flexible about the
details in any given bill in order to deal with political realities and
achieve these goals incrementally.
(3) The proponents of reform were more interested in the symbolic goal
of achieving some type of property rights reform than changing any
particular substantive or procedural takings rules.
As indicated below, 174 it is reasonable to believe that the first explanation
played a considerable role in the diversity of proposals. Even when addressing
a specific bill, the proponents of reform seemed unable to agree on the bill's
purpose or practical effects.
B. The Political Struggle
171
The South Carolina General Assembly is composed of two chambers:
(1) the House of Representatives, with 124 members elected for a term of two
years; and (2) the Senate, with forty-six members elected for a term of four
years. 76 Each member of the General Assembly is elected from a single
member district. 7 Along with many southern states, South Carolina has
recently experienced apolitical realignment as the Republican Party has gained
majority status. In South Carolina, this process has resulted in three Republican
governors 7' and, beginning in 1994, a majority of Republicans elected to the
House. 79 However, the Democrats still have a majority in the Senate." ° This
174. See infra notes 208-10, 238-41 and accompanying text.
175. An unpublished student research paper written during the spring semester of
1998 was helpful in writing this part of this Article. See William McIntosh, The Ordeal of
"Takings" Legislation in South Carolina: 1995-1998 (Spring, 1998) (unpublished directed
research paper, on file with author).
176. 1997 SOUTH CAROLNALEGISLATIVEMANUAL 17,80 (Sandra K. McKinney ed.,
1997) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE MANUAL].
177. Id.
178. The first modem Republican governor, James Edwards, was elected in 1974
largely because of a fluke. See COLE BLEASE GRAHAM, JR. & WILLIAM V. MOORE, SOUTH
CAROLINA POLITICS & GOVERNMENT 93-94 (1994). A more permanent political realignment
began in 1986 with the election of Carroll Campbell, a Republican who served two four-year
terms. Id. at 93-97. Campbell was constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, see
LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, supra note 176, at 7; and David Beasley, who is also a Republican, was
elected governor in the 1994 election. Id. at 15. In November 1998, James Hodges, a Democrat,
was elected governor. Joseph S. Stroud & Michael Sponhour, 'Historic' Upset Built on
Education, Lottery, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Nov. 4, 1998, at Al. The long term impact of
Hodges's election on the political landscape of South Carolina is not clear. See id. (noting unique
factors, like dislike of incumbent, that affected outcome); Michael Sponhour & Joseph S. Stroud,
Sleeping Democrats Awaken with a Roar, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.) Nov. 4, 1998, at Al
(noting that state "remains a Republican stronghold").
179. See Nina Brook & Cindi Ross Scoppe, Partisan Power-Sharing Argument
Highlight of Speaker Pro Tern Race, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Dec. 6, 1994, at BI (shifting
by two members from Democratic to Republican party resulted in the House having 62
Republicans, 58 Democrats, and four independents and created the first Republican majority
since Reconstruction). For general discussion of the growth of Republican power in the State
1998]
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shift in political power is important to the story of property rights reform in
South Carolina because the takings movement is closely aligned with the
Republican Party at the national level.''
Inevitably, any review of the political struggle over the takings reform
proposal will be superficial. A statewide debate among numerous people and
interest groups spanning several years cannot be summarized in a few
paragraphs. Moreover, much of the discussion on takings reform is hard to
research and authenticate because it is not a matter of public record. The
following discussion, therefore, is meant to convey only an overall sense of the
political treatment of the proposals.
1. 1995-96 Legislative Session
Though several bills had been introduced for the 1995-96 session, the
legislative and political debate focused on South Carolina House Bill 3790, the
first South Carolina Property Rights Act, which was introduced on March 14,
1995 by Rep. James R. Harrison (R-Richland).' s2 Initially, the chances of
passage appeared strong. The bill had wide legislative support as seventy
members of the House co-sponsored it.' 83 In addition, two influential interest
groups, the South Carolina Farm Bureau and the South Carolina Forestry
Association, quickly became vocal supporters of the bill. The bill also had wide
support from agricultural, forestry, development, and mining interests.'8 4 These
interests joined together to form the South Carolina Property Rights
Coalition.' Moreover, the political climate seemed receptive to such
legislation. The takings reform "movement" that was gathering momentum in
other states fit well with the agenda of the Republicans in South Carolina. 86
Moreover, the 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council'87
provided an example of "regulatory excess" that was well known in the state."'
legislature, see GRAHAM &MOORE, supra note 178, at 98-99, 119-37. The Republicans kept their
majority in the House in the 1998 election. Michael Sponhour & Joseph S. Stroud, Sleeping
Democrats Awaken with a Roar, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Nov. 4, 1998, at Al.
180. LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, supra note 176, at 17-45 (26 Democrats, 20
Republicans). In 1980, the Senate had just five Republicans, and this number had increased to
twelve by 1990. GRAHAM & MOORE, supra note 178, at 133-34. The Democrats kept their
majority in the Senate in the 1998 election. Michael Sponhour & Joseph S. Stroud, Sleeping
Democrats Awaken with a Roar, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Nov. 4, 1998, at Al.
18 1. See supra notes 79-80, 84 and accompanying text.
182. For discussion of the contents of this bill, see supra notes 144-49 and
accompanying text.
183. H.R. 3790, 11 1th Leg., Ist Sess. (S.C. 1995).
184. Monte Paulsen, S.C. Would Compensate 'Takings' of Property, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 15, 1995, at B1.
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
187. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see also supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text; Part
II.B.L.b (discussing Lucas).
188. See Max Kidalov, Comment, H. 3591: Affirming Traditional Principles of
Protection ofPrivate Property and the Environment, 6 S.C. ENVTL. L. J. 295,296 (1997) (noting
that Mr. LucA has been actively supporting reform in South Carolina and other states since his
victory in the Supreme Court).
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However, the House did not pass the bill largely for two reasons.' 9 First,
opposition to the bill soon emerged. Two powerful interest
groups-environmentalists and local governments-quickly aligned to fight the
bill,'90 and influential newspapers also opposed it.'9 ' Second, in a pattern that
would continue throughout the debate in South Carolina, the reformers agreed
on the need for reform, but they displayed no agreement on the desired goals
and effects of any such reform. 92
a. Opposition
Opponents of the bill relied on two types of criticisms-that the bill would
impose substantial costs on government and that it was contrary to American
ideological traditions. County and municipal governments, opposing the bill
through their respective associations, focused on the costs involved. On April
3, 1995, the South Carolina Association of Counties sent a position paper to
House members stating that "[p]assage ofH.3790 willplace local communities,
and ultimately taxpayers, under the continual threat of costly litigation."'93 The
Association indicated it would "advise counties to cease all planning and
zoning activities" upon passage of the bill because of the indeterminably high
fiscal impact of the bill.' 94 The Association also claimed that the bill could even
halt enforcement of existing building codes. 9 In a similar position paper, the
Municipal Association of South Carolina stated that this "[o]ne bill could
potentially reverse all efforts of local government planning and growth
management and deter economic development."' 96 In a challenge to the South
Carolina Tourism Council, a group ofmajor coastal area developers supporting
the bill,'9 7 the Municipal Association argued that the state's tourism industry
benefitted from historic preservation requirements and beachfront management
regulations, both of which would be jeopardized by the bill.'9
Environmentalists also stressed the costs involved. These costs include not
only the compensation paid for a taking, but also the costs of increased
litigation. The executive director of the South Carolina Chapter of the National
189. Passage of the bill was also hindered because its primary sponsor, Rep. Harrison,
was called to Army reserve duty in Bosnia during the session. Christina Binkley, Coalition Plans
to Push 'Takings Law,' WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1996, at 51.
190. See infra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
192. See infra Part IV.B.I.b.
193. Why "Takings " Legislation Hurts Local Communities (S.C. Ass'n of Counties,
Columbia, S.C.), Apr. 3, 1995, at 1.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2.
196. Private Property Rights and "Takings" (Mun. Ass'n of S.C., Columbia, S.C.),
Sept. 19, 1995, at 1.
197. The Tourism Council was emerging from behind the scenes as one of the
primary supporters of the bill. Included among the listed members of the Tourism Council were:
(1) The Beach Co., a Charleston developer; (2) several major Myrtle Beach area land owners;
and (3) Union Camp Corp., a national forest products company with plans to develop its vast
holdings in Beaufort County. Sammy Fretwell, Land, Laws Collide in 'Takings'Debate, THE
STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 15, 1998, at BI.
198. MUNICIPAL ASS'N OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 196, at 1.
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Wildlife Federation argued that this approach to takings was "only going to
benefit attorneys, appraisers and bureaucrats."' 99 The South Carolina Coastal
Conservation League, a non-profit organization viewed as influential with
coastal legislators, attacked the underlying ideology behind the takings reform
movement as "fundamentally unhealthy."2°° In particular, the League
challenged the validity of the proponents' picture of "landowner[s] ... [as]
helpless victim[s] of a malevolent government., 20 1 The League maintained that
"our system was painstakingly designed to allow citizens to participate in
lawmaking, by voicing their positions on specific legislation, by electing
competent and responsive representatives, and by running for office at every
level of government from town council to Congress.""2 2 Environmentalists
alleged "that the entire 'property rights' movement is a big-business wolf
dressed in the sheep's clothing of farmers and other small landowners. '203
The bill also faced media attacks on its underlying distributional premises.
On January 17, 1996, The State newspaper, published in South Carolina's
capitol city of Columbia, published two editorials attacking the bill. The first
editorial noted that when regulatory takings issues are litigated
[T]he courts balance "public benefit against private loss."
Over the last century, courts have decided that permissible
public goals include landmark preservation, protection of
wetlands, floodplains, open space and endangered species.
But the S.C. Property Rights bill before the Legislature
would compensate landowners whenever it "appears likely"
that a law would cause "substantial" diminishment of their
property's value.2"
The editorial concluded that the bill "could force us to pay a landowner not to
harm us. The Constitution did not guarantee landowners they could make the
most profitable use of their land or that they could make use of their land at the
expense of others' health and safety."20 5 The State's second editorial attacking
South Carolina House Bill 3791 noted that 83% of readers responding to its
annual legislative survey supported "[r]equiring the government to pay
property owners if it takes their land or passes laws-such as zoning or
199. Paulsen, supra note 184, at B I (quoting Trish Jerman, Executive Director, South
Carolina Chapter, National Wildlife Federation).
200. South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, "Takings" Laws: Are We Being
Taken?, THE COASTAL GUARDIAN, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 8.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Paulsen, supra note 184, at B1.
204. Takings Legislation Takes FarMore Than It Could Give, THESTATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Jan. 17, 1996, at A8. This paper published this editorial on a weekday while lawmakers
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environmental protection laws-that reduce the value of the land."2 6 However,
the editors argued that:
It's all in the wording. What would readers have said if
asked about ending regulationg that keep porn shops from
locating next to churches or liquor stores next to schools?
About regulations that protect historic Charleston or that keep
us from paying a polluter not to pollute? "Takings"
legislation could do that." 7
b. Goals and Effects of Reform
Supporters of reform argued that the current system had serious flaws. For
example, the South Carolina Farm Bureau Federation argued:
Even with favorable court decisions for property owners,
government regulation of property use has resulted in a
number of problems, including:
*Poor Planning and Waste of Resources. Presently,
regulatory agencies frequently ignore the financial
implications of their regulations. As a result, resources
available for important projects are often wasted when
unanticipated takings result.
-Excessive Litigation. Landowners who may be
financially ruined by regulatory takings receive no
compensation except after bringing legal proceedings.
Litigation for all parties with a government entity is
expensive and time consuming.
-Uncertainty. Because each regulatory taking is litigated
on a case-by-case basis, neither citizens nor the state can be
sure what regulations of property rights give rise to a right to
compensation."'
Although proponents of reform frequently repeated such general,
conclusory criticisms, they did not provide any details or specifies as to which
"regulatory agencies frequently ignore the financial implications of their
regulations," what resources had been "wasted when unanticipated takings
result," or which landowners "may be financially ruined." ' 9 A similar lack of
details characterized discussions of the bill. Proponents appeared to be
unconcerned or uncertain about the bill's purpose or legal effects. For example,
Rep. Harrison, the bill's sponsor, appeared uncertain whether the bill would
create a new standard for defining a taking or simply codify existing Fifth
206. Beware What You Support, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 17, 1996, at A8.
207. Id.
208. SOUTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET:
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Amendment case law."' °
2. 1997-98 Legislative Session
Following the failure of South Carolina House Bill 3790 in the 1995-1996
legislative session, proponents of takings reform prepared to reintroduce
legislation in the next session. Among those involved were the South Carolina
Tourism Council (comprised of developers and large property owners),21'
members of the South Carolina Chamber of Commerce, the South Carolina
Farm Bureau, the Realtors Association, the South Carolina Forestry
Association, and the Homebuilders Association.2" However, the state Chamber
of Commerce did not include a new takings bill when it released its 1997
legislative agenda.21 3 Pam Bennett, the executive director for the Tourism
Council, explained that the proponents' strategy was "to keep this within our
house" in order to keep potential opponents in the dark.2"4 This strategy was
undermined when The Wall Street Journal published an article profiling the
coalition's push several weeks before the new session. Jimmy Chandler,
attorney for the South Carolina Environmental Law Project, told the Journal
that, until the Journal had informed him, he "didn't know... the [proponents
of the reform] were coming back again this year."21
On March 4,1997, Rep. Jim Harrison (R-Richland), House Speaker David
Wilkins (R-Greenville), Rep. Hunter Limbaugh (R-Florence), and eighty other
House members introduced anew South Carolina Property Rights Act as South
Carolina House Bill 3591.216 After its first reading, the bill was assigned to the
House Judiciary Committee, chaired by Rep. Harrison.
On April 16, 1997, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee,
with virtually no debate orreview, "amended" South Carolina House Bill 3591
by substituting a completely different bill.21 7 The new bill was essentially
identical to Florida's recently enacted takings law. 218 On April 23, 1997, the
full House Judiciary Committee began consideration of the amended bill and,
on May 1, adopted it after very little deliberation, debate, or input from
interested parties. On May 27, 1997, the House of Representatives concluded
three days of debate on South Carolina House Bill 3591.9 and voted by a
margin of 78-35 to send the bill on to the Senate.220
Because the 1997 session was nearly over at this point, the Senate did not
210. See Letter from Nina Morais, South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, to
The Honorable James H. Harrison, Chairman, South Carolina House ofRepresentatives Judiciary
Committee I (Oct. 19, 1995) (on file with author).
211. See Fretwell, supra note 197, at BI.
212. Binkley, supra note 189, at 51; Fretwell, supra note 197, at B1.
213. Bindey, supra note 189, at 51.
214. Id. (quoting PamBennett, Executive Director, South Carolina Tourism Council).
215. Id. (quoting Jimmy Chandler, Attorney, South Carolina Environmental Law
Project).
216. See supra notes 150-60 and accompanying text for discussion of this bill.
217. See supra Part IV.A.2.b for discussion of this amended bill.
218. Seesupra notes 117-25 and accompanying text for discussion of the Florida act.
219. 4 H.J. 3457 (1997).
220. Id. at 3505-06.
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consider South Carolina House Bill 3591 until the 1998 session.22 ' It was
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee where Sen. Don Holland, chair of
the Committee, appointed a subcommittee, and on April 8, 1998, this
subcommittee held a public hearing to consider the bill.z 2 At the conclusion of
this hearing, the subcommittee chair, Sen. Glenn McConnell, requested that
proponents and opponents of the bill meet to determine if a compromise was
possible.' These efforts to find a compromise were not successful, and the
1997-98 session ended before the subcommittee could reconsider the bill.
This inability to compromise was largely due to a substantial effort by
opponents of the bill. Initially, takings legislation had received relatively little
public attention. However, after the House passed the substituted version of
South Carolina House Bill 3591, both sides in the struggle became actively
involved in presenting their respective positions. Not surprisingly, this renewed
public debate paralleled the earlier controversy that had occurred during the
1995-96 session.
a. Opposition
Once again, opponents stressed that the bill would make important,
necessary governmental regulation very expensive. In order to push this
argument, the opponents used the six month break between the 1997 and the221
1998 legislative sessions to form the Beat the Burden Coalition. Members of
this diverse group included the League of Women Voters of South Carolina,
the Municipal Association of South Carolina, the South Carolina Association
of Counties, the South Carolina Christian Action Council, the South Carolina
Downtown Development Association, the National Trust for Historic
Preservation, and the South Carolina Wildlife Federation.225 The Coalition
distributed a pamphlet that stressed how passage of South Carolina House Bill
3591 would result in "skyrocketing costs to taxpayers," "costly court battles,"
and "threatened quality of life.""n6 These vague, conclusory statements were
buttressed by two additional attacks.
First, opponents argued that special interests were "buying" legislation.
The Coalition described proponents as "big developers, some from out of state,
221. A similar bill was also introduced in the Senate on April 23, 1997. See S. 686,
112th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997). Senators John Land and Don Holland sponsored this bill.
Because the House version was acted upon and passed prior to any action on the Senate version,
South Carolina House Bill 3591 became the vehicle for any sort of "takings" legislation which
might be passed during the legislative session. This is the normal process when companion bills
are introduced in the House and Senate; the bill making the route faster is usually the one
ultimately considered. This Senate bill was not a typical companion bill because it was
introduced after the House subcommittee had substituted the Florida takings act for the original
version of South Carolina House Bill 3591. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
222. Audio tape of Subcommittee Hearing on South Carolina House Bill 3591 (April
8, 1998) (on file with author).
223. Id.
224. Fretwell, supra note 197, at B1.
225. BEAT THE BURDEN, STRAIGHT ANsWERs ON THE "INORDINATE BURDEN" BILL I
(n.d.).
226. Id. at 2.
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along with their attorneys. Also on board are real estate, billboard, petroleum,
and factory hog farming interests." 7 Another opponent argued that, though
few House members understood the effect of the bill, "[w]hen you spend
$300,000 lobbying for a bill, you're going to get a lot of signatures.""2
Second, opponents persuaded legislators that the bill would negatively
impact zoning 229 Several factors helped opponents make this argument. First,
the language of the bill clearly included zoning.230 Second, it was easy to argue
that the bill could severely hamper popular land use regulation schemes." l
Third, many parts of the state do not have any zoning.232 In these areas, if
comprehensive zoning were initially enacted after passage of South Carolina
House Bill 3591, it would arguably be necessary to compensate all property
owners suffering a reduction in property value as a result of the new zoning
scheme. 3 Fourth, these arguments were readily expressed because local
officials have easy access to and credibility with legislators. 4 Finally, the
227. Id. at 1.
228. Arlie Porter, 'Takings Bill' Faces Local Ire, THE POST & COUIUER (Charleston,
S.C.), Feb. 27, 1998, at I-B (quoting Nancy Bloodgood, Charleston County Deputy Attorney).
The State newspaper reported that supporters of property rights reform spent $280,000 lobbying
the legislature in 1997, while opponents only spent $90,000. Fretwell, supra note 197, at B1.
229. Some legislators indicated they would oppose the bill if it restricted zoning but
were unsure whether it would do so. See, e.g., Legislation Isn 't Needed to Guard Property
Rights, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 19, 1998, at A8 (comments of Sen. John Land). Thus,
it was important that opponents succeed in making it clear that zoning would be affected.
230. The bill defined governmental entity to include county governments and
municipalities. H.R. 3591,112th Leg., lst Sess. § 28-4-30(B)(3) (S.C. 1997) (as adopted by the
House on May 28, 1997). The bill also provided that it was not deemed to prevent the exercise
of zoning powers so long as they were exercised in a manner "consistent with the provisions in
this chapter." Id. § 28-4-30(C). Though the Florida act does not contain such a provision, the
Florida act and the South Carolina bill do not differ in terms of effect. For a discussion that the
Florida act does apply to zoning and could require compensation for downzoning, see, for
example, Powell, supra note 117, at 289. Similarly, the South Carolina takings bill would apply
to zoning because the bill required that zoning be "consistent" with the provisions of the bill.
231. For example, the use of zoning restrictions to regulate "sexually oriented
businesses" is a very popular zoning technique being adopted by many local governments in
South Carolina. For further discussions on this particular use of zoning from both pro and con
standpoints, see, for example, James C. Bradley, Note, Don't Come AroundHere No More: The
Regulation ofAdult Businesses-Zoning or Entitlements?, 49 S.C. L. REv. 1007 (1998); Jeffrey
P. Dunlaevy, Note, Dirty Dancing: The South Carolina Supreme Court Rejects LocalAuthority
to Ban Nude Dancing by Fast-Stepping Around the Plain Meaning of the South Carolina
Constitution, 49 S.C. L. Rv. 1025 (1998). Opponents of the bill argued that local governments
might have to compensate property owners who suffered a loss in property value as a result of
a zoning restriction on sexually oriented businesses. Proponents of reform argued that the bill
would not affect this type ofzoning because prohibiting this one use would not, by itself, reduce
the value of the land. See Subcommittee Hearing Tape, supra note 222 (statement of Rep.
Harrison). For further discussion of this issue, see infra note 240.
232. Twenty-six counties do not have any zoning. Subcommittee Hearing Tape, supra
note 222 (statement of Howard Duvall, appearing for the Municipal Association).
233. At the subcommittee hearing on H.R. 3591, a member of the subcommittee, Sen.
Bryan from Laurens County, expressed concern about the impact of the bill on the ability of
Laurens County, which currently does not have zoning, to adopt zoning in the future.
Subcommittee Hearing Tape, supra note 222 (statement of Sen. Bryan).
234. In many South Carolina cities and counties, local neighborhood organizations
have considerable impact on local zoning decisions. Therefore, it might have been expected that
they would play a similar role in expressing concerns to legislators. Yet their role appears to
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proponents' argument that it was unfair to make a property owner bear the
costs of achieving a broad public goal was inapplicable in most zoning
situations. Typically, the underlying conflict in a zoning dispute is between
private land owners. For example, an owner wants to have a store, but the
owners of the adjacent residences fear that the store will reduce the value of
their homes. Such individualized situations differ from disputes over an
environmental regulation between a land owner and the public, where the aim
is to preserve some common, public good like air quality. Opponents argued
that, given this context, the bill was unfair, and perhaps unconstitutional,
because it limited the ability of local government to protect adjoining land
owners from the negative effects of certain types of land use. Because of
these factors, opponents enjoyed considerable success in convincing influential
senators that the bill would make substantive changes in zoning law and that
these changes could require compensation in many cases.236
b. Goals and Effects of Reform
As with South Carolina House Bill 3790, the supporters of South Carolina
have been very limited in both the 1995-96 session and the 1997-98 session. For example, the
Columbia, South Carolina, Council of Neighborhoods was a member of the Beat the Burden
Coalition. However, Rep. Harrison, the sponsor of both property rights bills represents an area
in Columbia, South Carolina, which has one of the oldest and most influential neighborhood
organizations in the city. Yet his support for the bills does not seem to have had any effect on
his political base in the neighborhood. Representative Harris was reelected in 1996 and was not
opposed in in the 1998 general election.
235. See, e.g., Subcommittee Hearing Tape, supra note 222 (statement of Prof.
Elizabeth Patterson pointing out "constitutionally troubling aspects" of the bill).
236. For example, Sen. Larry Martin (R-Pickens) expressed concerns that the bill
could impact local governments' ability to regulate sexually oriented businesses without
becoming a huge burden on taxpayers. Martin remarked that the Senate should "be careful about
how we proceed. There's not any question about that. It doesn't take but one little sentence to
ultimately wreak havoc on the taxpayers." Jennifer Langston, Property Rights Law Could Upset
Legal Balance, THE GREENVILLE NEWS (Greenville, S.C.), Dec. 24, 1997, at IA; see also
Subcommittee Hearing Tape, supra note 222 (Sen. Martin remarking that"I would sure hate to
think that weput ourselves in a box [by adopting H.3591] on that type ofbusiness enterprise.").
The State newspaper also noted in an editorial that the bill could affect "Columbia's efforts to
limit where X-rated businesses can locate." Legislation Isn tfNeeded to Guard Property Rights,
supra note 229; see also Sammy Fretwell, Bill Would Hobble Land-Use Laws, Critics Charge,
THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), May 9, 1997, at BI (stating that the Mayor of Columbia, South
Carolina, held a press conference in front of an adult bookstore and said that this "legislation
would prevent the city from keeping more sex shops and strip clubs out of Columbia"). The
Coastal Conservation League also expressed similarconcems arguing against the property rights
bill. See THE NEW PROPERTY RIGHTS BILL, supra note 125. Opponents of new statutory rights to
compensation in other states have expressed similar concerns. See, e.g., Marzulla, supra note 79,
at 635 (noting that concern with power to "zone the location ofpomography shops" was a factor
in defeating a broad-based compensation scheme in Mississippi); Timothy Egan, Unlikely
Alliances Attack Property Rights Measures, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1995, at Al ("What if a
government entity decided that a topless bar could not open next to a church .... Would acts
of government even as routine as these require taxpayers to pay the owners of property that
declined in value as a result?"). For a counterargument by proponents that the bill would not
affect the ability to restrict sexually-oriented businesses in South Carolina, see supra note 231.
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House Bill 3591 were unclear about its purpose or effect.3 7 Evidence of this
uncertainty was made public in several ways. First, "sound bite" public
relations statements of little substance found their way into the public. These
statements asserted that reform was necessary and beneficial, but they were
vague about the precise problems to be addressed by reform and the effects of
the bill.3 Some proponents also claimed that the bill would not have any
substantive effect on existing law,"9 while others said that the bill would create
new substantive rights.24 Proponents also argued, in a somewhat conclusory
fashion, that these new rights were fair or necessary, that implementing them
would not create serious problems, and that any resulting payout costs or
237. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing South Carolina House Bill 3790).
238. For example, on January 1, 1998, the South Carolina Tourism Council prepared
a review of the final version of H.R. 3591. The South Carolina Private Property Rights
Protection Act (South Carolina Tourism Council, Inc., Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 1,1998 (on file with
author) [hereinafter "Summary"]. The Summary noted that the act "is patterned after Florida's
Act which became law in October 1995." Id. at 1. According to the Summary, the intent of the
legislation is to "establish a solution-oriented process which strikes a balance between public and
private interests and promotes settlements outside of the costly court system." Id. The Summary
argues that the act would establish such a process by encouraging government "regulators to
develop flexible and creativeways ofachieving the same result while eliminating the impairment
of private property rights. These measures could include the use of variances, marketable
emission credits, transfer development rights, mitigation and private sector incentives." Id.
239. For example, Rep. Harrison, the sponsor of South Carolina House Bill 3591,
stated:
[T]he intent of H.R. 3591 [is] to establish
a solution-oriented process which strikes a balance
between public and private interests and promotes
settlements outside of the costly court system.
Nothing in this bill would prevent
governments from adopting strict land-use plans. It
would not impede regulations protecting the
environment. It would have no effect on much-
needed nuisance laws. The bill simply guarantees
property owners aprocedure by which they can seek
compensation from government if their property is
inordinately burdened by governmental actions.
Letter from James H. Harrison, Chairman, South Carolina House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee, to Henry E. Brown, Jr., Chairman, South Carolina House of Representatives Ways
and Means Committee 2 (May 8, 1997) (on file with author) (emphasis added). Additionally, the
Summary prepared by the South Carolina Tourism Council asserts that the Florida law has not
produced a flood of litigation and claims that "nothing in H.3591 would prevent governments
from adopting strict land-use plans," nor would it "wreak havoc on environmental regulations."
Summary, supra note 238, at2; see also Subcommittee Hearing Tape, supra note 222 (statement
of David Lucas adopting this view of the bill).
240. See, e.g., Subcommittee Hearing Tape, supra note 222 (statement of Neil
Robinson, attorney appearing on behalf of supporters of the bill). In 1996, Mr. Robinson said:
"If you want to prevent strip shopping centers on every comer, that's laudable-but I'm just
saying they ought to be prepared to pay for it." Binkley, supra note 189, at 51. In 1998,
Mr. Robinson stated, "We think some chilling effect on government is appropriate and we don't
make any apologies about that at all." Fretwell, supra note 197, at BI.
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reduction in regulation would be proper.24
The variation in the proponents' descriptions of the bill's goals and effects
could be due to many factors. For example, it could be due to clear, substantial
disagreement amongproponents, to uncertainty or misunderstanding on the part
of some proponents, or to tactical decisions about how best to sell property
rights reform. Whatever the cause, the failure of proponents to articulate a clear
view of their goals and of the details of the bill may have had a substantial
negative impact on the chances of passage of reform legislation because this
failure facilitated the efforts of the bill's opponents to present their
characterizations of the bill's goals and effects.
C. The Future of "Takings Reform" in South Carolina
Several factors indicate that some sort of takings proposals will be
introduced in the 1999-2000 legislative session. First, the stakes are high;
regulations do in fact impose substantial restrictions and costs on owners.
Second, the passage of House Bill 3591 in the South Carolina House provides
reform supporters with hope of success in the next session either with a bill
based on House Bill 3591 or with a different type of bill. Third, passage of
even a limited procedural or assessment bill would constitute a symbolic
victory for proponents of reform.242 Finally, the mere consideration of a
property rights bill has several important advantages: (1) It provides a forum
for criticizing current doctrine243 and for arguing in favor of increased property
rights protection; (2) it may chill regulatory zeal because regulators will not
want to provide concrete examples of unfair impacts on property value; (3) it
would keep regulators busy fighting a property rights bill, leaving them less
time to push for new regulatory legislation; and (4) it may affect the treatment
of any new regulatory legislation.
Though it is likely that takings reform proposals will be introduced in the
1999-2000 legislative session, their form is uncertain. One reason for this
uncertainty is that the proponents' goals remain unclear. This lack of clarity as
to goals is reflected not only in the disagreement among reform supporters as
to the goals and effects of legislation,244 but also by the diversity of the
proposed bills.245 Another reason for uncertainty is that opponents of extreme
reform may offer "defensive" bills which would make only minor changes.
Because legislative response to property rights reform will largely depend on
241. See, e.g., supra note 240; Subcommittee Hearing on "State Approaches to
Protecting Private Property Rights," 112th Leg., 1st. Sess. (S.C. 1997) (testimony of Chip
Campsen, member of South Carolina House of Representatives) (supporting reform). Dwight
Stewart, a consulting forester and agricultural property manager, stated: "If regulations are
required to take private property rights for the common good, then I think the citizens should
also be willing to share its costs." Subcommittee Hearing Tape, supra note 222.
242. See infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text for discussion of reasons to adopt
such a bill.
243. See supra note 83 and accompanying text for discussion of reform rhetoric in
terms of three facts of life concerning regulatory takings.
244. See supra notes 129, 208-10, 238-41 and accompanying text.
245. See supra Part IV.A.
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the nature of the proposals involved, it is impossible to predict what the
legislature may do in the 1999-2000 session. For example, a relatively mild
assessment-type bill is more likely to pass than a bill substantially enlarging the
definition of a taking.2'
V. SoME NORMATIVE COMMENTS
The specific content of any takings legislation adopted in South Carolina,
or any other state, will be determined largely by the relative political strength
and skill of proponents and opponents and by the normative merits of the
proposals involved. To the extent that normative concerns like fairness are
involved, it is impossible to be neutral about takings reform. No clear,
noncontroversial guide for deciding whether a property owner should be
compensated if regulation reduces his property value has been presented.
Nevertheless, irrespective ofwhat one believes about thefairness ofthe current
system, it is possible to make some relatively neutral remarks regarding the
strengths and weaknesses of various proposals for states in general and for
South Carolina in particular.
A. General Comments
The first general comment is that there is no one-size-fits-all property
rights bill suitable for every state. The states vary enormously in terms of both
physical attributes and legal context. Thus, it is not surprising that the national
movement for property rights reform has been national only in the sense of
expression of dissatisfaction with existing takings doctrine. Each state has
addressed that dissatisfaction in a very unique and localized manner.247
Second, common sense indicates that legislators should be clear about the
goals of reform and the effects of proposed legislation. The role, if any, that
this common-sense concern for clarity has played in other states is hard to
determine. In some states, public indifference may have resulted in little
demand for clear statements about goals and effects.243 In other states, cultural
or symbolic concerns may have been more important than careful legislative
analysis of the bill at issue.249 For example, as a result of concern by blacks in
Mississippi that a compensation bill was "racially motivated against blacks,
... every black representative and senator voted against the bill. 250
Third, assessment statutes have considerable advantages from a political
246. See infra Part V.B.3.
247. See supra Part II.B.l.a to Part III.B.l.c.
248. See, e.g., George E. Grimes, Jr., Comment, Texas Private Real Property Rights
Preservation Act: A Political Solution to the Regulatory Takings Problem, 27 ST. MARtY'S L.J.
557, 607 (1996) ("[T]he public in Texas has been largely indifferent to the [act] .... ).
249. See, e.g., Brick & Cawley, supra note 81, at 303 (noting the view of
environmentalists as "outsiders" and "elitists"); Jacobs & Ohm, supra note 84, at 217-18
(property rights as cultural symbol in struggle between urban/suburban interests and rural
interests in Wisconsin and Minnesota); Lavelle, supra note 133, at 34 (noting "city vs.
county"split).
250. Marzulla, supra note 79, at 635.
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perspective. Ironically, the fact that assessment schemes are generally limited
in effect" is, perhaps, a major advantage in the political context. One reason
for the relatively widespread adoption of such schemes is that they provide a
basis for compromise: Regulators can live with such limited changes, and
proponents of reform can achieve a symbolic victory. 2
Fourth, procedural reforms can be helpful, but only to a limited extent. As
a general rule, procedural reforms tend to have less impact than substantive
reform. Consequently, procedural reforms are more likely than substantive
reforms to achieve a measure of success without resulting in substantial costs.
One procedural reform that merits consideration is the adoption of a scheme
that makes a decision ripe for judicial review within a relatively short period
of time. The effect of this reform is very narrow because: (1) it makes no
substantive changes in existing takings doctrine, including the lack of a
standard and the presumption in favor of the validity ofregulation;' 3 (2) it only
addresses takings challenges to regulation; and (3) if a change in ripeness rules
is too broad, it may run afoul of the constitutional "case or controversy"
requirement." 4 Nevertheless, this approach could provide property owners
with quick, certain access to the courts to assert some takings claims. Arguably,
it will also force regulators to assess more carefully cases that are likely to be
litigated. As with assessment provisions, the limited role of procedural reform
means that it could provide a basis for compromise.
Fifth, if adopted, substantive reforms should be narrowly tailored. Though
there is considerable debate about the costs of legislatively adopting a different
standard for a compensable taking than that used in the constitutional context,
it is logical to think that substantial costs will be involved.25 Consequently, it
seems prudent to proceed cautiously and incrementally in adopting a new
substantive standard. Specifically, if a new standard is adopted, it should be
limited in terms of: (1) the types of losses in property value that are
compensable, (2) the types of regulatory schemes affected, and (3) the impact
on the budget of the regulating agency. Each limitation is discussed below in
further detail within the context of potential South Carolina legislation. 6
B. South Carolina
1. Each State Is Unique
South Carolina's experience with the amended version of South Carolina
House Bill 3591,"s which was based on the Florida act,258 indicates the
251. See Cordes, supra note 79, at 221-25; supra text accompanying notes 102-06;
infra Part V.B.3.
252. See supra text following note 106.
253. See supra Part IIB.1 for a discussion on the lack of any standard and
presumption in favor of validity.
254. See TRIBE, supra note 70, § 3-10.
255. See supra text following note 125.
256. See infra Part V.B.5.a and Part V.B.5.b.
257. See supra Part IV.A.2.b.
258. See supra note 117.
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importance of considering the individual characteristics of each state. The
differences between the two states in terms of such physical attributes as size,
population, economy, and history are obvious. Moreover, the regulatory
context is different in each state. Florida has been in the forefront of adopting
statutory schemes for environmental and regional planning;259 whereas South
Carolina has large areas with no zoning schemes. 26 These differences do not
mean that Florida's act should be ignored. South Carolina can and should learn
from the experience of other states. However, any use of another state's
approach must be done with an appreciation of the differences between that
state and South Carolina.
2. Proponents ofReform Should Have the Burden ofArticulating the
Goals of Reform and the Effects ofProposed Legislation
It is not clear whether South Carolina needs reform. This uncertainty is
partly due to the controversial nature of deciding whether the current system
is unfair. It is also due to the fact that in four years of political debate, only
limited discussion of the specifics concerning why reform is needed or how it
should be achieved has taken place. Though proposed changes in basic rules
about regulation of land use should be considered carefully, state legislators
cannot personally examine all proposed legislation in detail. Therefore, careful
committee review is essential. The reviewing process should require
proponents of change to articulate specific goals and effects. To date,
supporters of property rights reform have not satisfied this burden.
Virtually the only concrete example of unfairness identified by reform
proponents is the experience of David Lucas.26' However, his case does not
support an assertion of systemic unfairness because: (1) Mr. Lucas is not an
ordinary, common person-his "taken" property consisted of two exclusive
oceanfront lots purchased for nearly one million dollars,262 (2) Mr. Lucas did
get compensated under existing compensation rules, even though it cost him a
considerable amount of time and money to do so,263 and (3) the statutory
scheme under which his lots were taken has now been amended to provide a
mechanism to avoid such takings.26 These circumstances do not show that the
system is inherently unfair. One such unique, isolated instance cannot provide
such a showing.
Rather than address the task of articulating the goals and effects of specific
legislative proposals, proponents of change have argued in vague, conclusory
terms that the system is unfair and inefficient and have offered numerous
solutions that are allegedly designed to address these problems. However, they
have not identified the problems in any concrete fashion, nor have they
259. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET. AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND
DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 870-71, 878-81 (4th ed. 1995).
260. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
261. See supra Part II.B.l.b and notes 31-55 and accompanying text for discussion
of Mr. Lucas' takings lawsuit.
262. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006-08 (1992).
263. Id. at 1009.
264. Id. at 1010-14.
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discussed how the proposed legislation will address specific problems. The net
result is that they appear to be offering solutions that are in search of problems.
3. Though Assessment Provisions Have Limited Effects, They May
Provide Some Improvement and Can Provide a Useful Approach
to Compromise
As indicated above,26' assessment provisions are generally limited in effect
because no standard for identifying a taking exists and because the provisions
are either so formalistic that regulators easily satisfy them or so detailed and
substantial that regulators follow them only in a pro forma manner. Regulators
are unlikely to follow a detailed assessment provision because they have
limited personnel and budgets to handle a large workload. For example,
Columbia, South Carolina, has four entities constantly making zoning
decisions: (1) the City Council, (2) the Planning Commission, (3) the Zoning
Board of Adjustment, and (4) the Landmarks Commission. In a given month,
these bodies make dozens of decisions affecting property values. If the
legislature were to adopt an easily satisfied, formalistic assessment statute, this
decisionmaking could continue withoutproblem. However, ifa statute required
the city planning staff to make detailed, written takings assessments based on
listed factors for each decision, zoning would virtually stop. The planning staff
is not large enough to do such assessments along with its current tasks. It is
unlikely that Columbia is going to increase its budget substantially for planning
staff. Nor is it likely that Columbia will stop zoning activities. As a result,
takings assessments are likely to be done in a quick, formal manner that would
be contrary to a strict assessment statute.
Several assessment schemes have beenproposed for South Carolina, either
as independent bills or as part of a more comprehensive proposal.266 The
difficulty with these schemes as a basis for compromise is that they would
impose substantial administrative burdens on regulators. Consequently,
administrators would be faced with the dilemma of choosing between
superficial compliance and substantive compliance, which would reduce their
ability to regulate. In addition, if opponents were to agree to an assessment
scheme, this agreement could be viewed as a recognition that current practice
is somehow wrong or unfair. In this way, the agreement or compromise could
become an argument by proponents for broader, more substantive changes.
Thus, opponents of reform have fought the proposed assessment schemes.
Because of these concerns, assessment proposals have not provided abasis
for compromise in South Carolina. However, if a clearly limited assessment
proposal could be combined with assurances that the proposal was not simply
the first step toward broader reform, it might be possible to persuade opponents
265. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
266. See S. 374, 11 1th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1995) (assessment scheme only); H.R.
3790, 111 th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1995) (assessment scheme as part of scheme with statutory
standard for compensation); H.R. 3591, 112th Leg., Ist Sess. (S.C. 1997) (as introduced Mar.
4,1997) (assessment scheme only); H.R. 3591, 112th Leg., lst Sess. (S.C. 1997) (as adopted by
the House on May 28, 1997) (assessment scheme with statutory standard for compensation).
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to agree. However, whether such a symbolic victory would satisfy proponents
of reform is unclear, given the uncertainty as to their goals.267
4. Procedural Reform Can Be Helpful to a Limited Extent and Can
Provide a Basis for Compromise
Procedural reforms are generally more likely than substantive reforms to
do some good without resulting in substantial harm. 6' This is particularly true
regarding well drafted schemes for achieving a decision that is ripe for judicial
review within a relatively short period of time. These benefits and the low cost
of procedural reform could provide a basis for compromise in South Carolina
as long as the new procedures are not unduly burdensome. In 1995, the
Municipal Association proposed that both sides in the dispute consider a
process of administrative review of a takings claim.269
A compromise on limited procedural reform has not been possible because
no bill has involved procedural reform alone. One example is the version of
South Carolina House Bill 3591 as adopted by the House.2 70 The procedural
provisions in that bill could be viewed as burdensome, and the proposals were
part of a scheme that included a new substantive standard for takings.27
Consequently, the total scheme was strongly opposed, particularly by
environmentalists and local governments. Even if a bill contained only
limited procedural reforms, opponents might still oppose it if they are not given
assurances that the procedural bill is not simply the first step in further reform
efforts.
Insofar as procedural reforms other than changes in ripeness rules are
concerned, the legislative proposals thus far contain many provisions that
appear unnecessary in terms ofzoning because similar provisions already exist.
The enabling act that will govern all zoning in South Carolina after May 3,
1999, achieves flexibility through the following methods:
(1) In addition to classical Euclidian zoning, the property owner may also
request the following zoning classifications: "cluster development,"
"floating zone[s]," "performance zoning," "planned development
district," "overlay zone," and "conditional uses."273
(2) Existing uses are generally allowed as a "nonconformity" or
267. See supra text accompanying note 208; supra notes 238-41 and accompanying
text.
268. See supra Part III.B.l.b; supra text accompanying notes 253-56.
269. Memorandum from Howard Duvall, Municipal Association of South Carolina
on Administrative Review of Takings to Interested Parties 1 (Sep. 25, 1995) (on file with
author).
270. S.C. H.R. 3591 (as adopted by the House on May 28, 1997); Part IV.A.2.b.
271. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
272. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
273. S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-720(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). Most large cities in
South Carolina utilize these techniques under existing law. See, e.g., COLUMBIA, S.C., CODE
§§ 17-241, -248 (1998) (overlay districts); id. §§ 17-247, -305 (planned unit development
districts); id. § 17-301 (cluster development).
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(3) Owners may request variances and special exceptions in unique
circumstances.275
(4) Owners may obtain feedback from regulators concerning
subdivision schemes. 6
As a general rule, the exercise of this flexible zoningpoweris explicitly subject
to prompt judicial review. 7 This right of review is sometimes granted to
adjoining owners as well.
Perhaps similar flexibility should be adopted for environmental
regulation. 279 If so, such flexibility should be part of the environmental scheme
involved or addressed to a class of similar environmental schemes. Such a
focused approach could fit into the existing administrative structure. In
contrast, a broad-based statute affecting all regulation, including zoning, could
create problems like the unnecessary and potentially costly duplication of
existing administrative flexibility.
5. IfAdopted, Substantive Reforms Should Be Narrowly Tailored
As indicated above, there is considerable debate about the desirability of
legislative adoption of a different standard for a compensable taking than that
used in the constitutional context.280 One reason for this debate is uncertainty
regarding costs. The State Budget and Control Board concluded that the fiscal
impact of South Carolina House Bill 3591 was indeterminable.28' Opponents
274. S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-730 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). The enabling statute
authorizes this technique and "amortization" approaches. Such techniques are generally used in
city ordinances under the current South Carolina enabling statute. See, e.g., COLUMBIA, S.C.,
CODE §§ 17-201 to -205 (1998) (nonconforming uses and lots); id. § 17-381(g) (amortization
period for nonconforming sexually oriented businesses).
275. S.C. CODEANN. § 6-29-800 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). The new enabling statute
authorizes these techniques, and they have been universally adopted under the current enabling
legislation. For example of inclusion of variance and special exceptions as "new" rights in
property rights reform, see supra note 159.
276. S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-1150 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (providing for
submission of "sketch plans, preliminary plans, and final plans for review"). Similar statutory
authorization exists under current legislation and local governments follow this approach. See,
e.g., COLUMBIA, S.C., CODE § 17-491 (1998) (governing plat approval).
277. For examples of statutes requiring prompt judicial review, see, S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 6-29-760(D), -820,-900,-1150(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
278. For examples of statutes providing standing to adjoining land owners, see, S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 6-29-760(C), -820, -900 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
279. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Klavens,At the Edge of Environmental Adjudication: An
Administrative Takings Variance, 18 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 277, 343 (1994) (arguing that a
"hardship variance" may be a useful environmental tool).
280. See supra Part III.A; notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
281. Memorandum from the Office ofState Budget, Budget and Control Board to The
Honorable James H. Harrison, Chairman, South Carolina House Judiciary Committee I (Apr.22,
1997) (on file with author). The fiscal impact statement seems to be based on a misunderstanding
of how land use decisions affect property value. For example, it focuses on the granting of
permits instead of discussing conduct that could reduce property value and thus involve a
potential taking, such as changes in zoning classifications or adoption ofnew zoning restrictions
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offered an estimated cost of"$100,000,000 to $125,000,000 a year in litigation
costs, administrative costs, and payments to property owners," but conceded
that this was a "best of our ability" estimate by a "panel of experts." '282 The
benefits of any costs are also unclear due to the limited articulation of the
concrete problems to be addressed by reform.283 The net result is that it is
unclear whether South Carolina should substantively change the standard for
granting compensation for a regulatory taking. Nevertheless, if it is decided
that such a change is desirable, several concerns should be addressed in
determining the content of any substantive change.
a. Limitations on Types of Loss in Property Value That Give
Rise to Right to Compensation Should Be Considered
The approach used in the Florida act appears to grant a right to
compensation for any property value reduction." 4 Given the uncertainties
concerning the costs of any substantive change in takings law, a more limited
approach merits consideration if one decides that a substantive change is in
order. This approach can be accomplished in three ways: (1) limitations based
on a percentage of lost value, (2) flexible limits based on concerns of "fairness"
in the context of a particular regulatory scheme, and (3) an overall balancing
approach.
(1) Limitations Based on Percentage Loss in Market Value
The major objections to existing takings law are its uncertainty, the costs
involved in determining whether a taking has occurred, and the fact that
substantial losses in value may not involve a constitutional taking.285 One way
to ameliorate these problems is to define a "taking" in terms of loss in property
value, which is arguably more fair and provides a relatively clear test. This is
the approach used in the amended version of South Carolina House Bill 3591.
Problems still exist with this approach. One problem is that, in many cases,
determining a regulation's impact on market value will be complex and
difficult. A market value test is only clear and simple by comparison to the
existing constitutional approach, which relies upon case by case
determinations. Moreover, as opponents of South Carolina House Bill 3591
(which do not usually involve a taking under the constitutional standard).
282. See, e.g., Subcommittee Hearing Tape, supra note 222 (statement of Howard
Duval, appearing for South Carolina Municipal Association). Dana Beach, speaking later on
behalf of the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League at the Senate Subcommittee Hearing,
noted that copies of the study providing these figures had been made available to the
Subcommittee. Beach described the panel membership, stressing that it included people from
both the public and private sector, including a past president of the State Chamber of Commerce.
He also indicated that the lowest estimate was $60,000,000, and that "for every dollar that goes
to a property owner, more than $5 goes to lawyers, litigation costs, appraisers, and bureaucratic
processes." Id. (statement of Dana Beach).
283. See supra text accompanying note 209; supra notes 238-42 and accompanying
text.
284. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
285. See supra Part II.B.; supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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noted, this relative clarification is achieved by granting a new substantive right
to owners. This new right may involve substantial costs, and critics dispute its
fairness.286 These cost and fairness problems suggest that if reduction in
property value is used to define taking, this approach should be limited. One
approach used in some states is to limit the right by providing that an owner has
no right to compensation unless a certain percentage of the property's value is
lost.287
There are several reasons to limit the right to compensation to situations
where the property owner suffers a loss above some cut-off point-for
example, a property value loss of fifty percent or more.288 First, determining
compensation by loss of property value provides a relatively easily applied
standard. Second, a fifty percent cut-off point is arguably a fairer way of
balancing the social benefits against the costs to the owner.289 Where the impact
is less than fifty percent, the cost to the owner is lower and can more easily be
viewed as "part of the burden of common citizenship,"2 ' particularly given the
reciprocal benefits that an owner may receive from regulation.29' When the
impact is above fifty percent, it can be argued that the burden "should be borne
by the public as a whole."292 Third, this approach will limit the number of
claims and thus reduce both administrative and claim costs for regulatory
entities.
In some cases, a test based on a minimum-percentage-value loss will
present difficulties that do not exist with a test based on any reduction in value.
For example, if the property involved is part of a large tract, is the percentage
in loss determined by reference to the part affected by the regulation or by the
entire tract?293 A simple answer is to use the entire tract as the basis. This
approach provides a certain, easily applied test. Moreover, this test is fair for
two reasons. First, because only large tracts of land will likely be affected by
this rule, the impact on the owners' total wealth (at least as measured by the
value of the total tract) will probably be less. Second, the owner always has the
right to compensation under the constitutional takings test.
Another problem is the possibility that the government or the owner will
try to manipulate the rule. For example, a regulatory entity could adopt a series
286. See supra notes 87-92,282 and accompanying text; supra Part IV.B.2.a.
287. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
288. South Carolina Senate Bill 121, introduced in 1995, utilized a 50% approach.
S. 121, 11 1th Leg., 1st Sess., § 2(A) (S.C. 1995). See also supra text accompanying notes 139-
40. Defenders of Property Rights, a group pushing for property rights reform nationally, has
drafted a model takings bill making 50% the point triggering compensation. See Marzulla,supra
note 79, at 635.
289. Cf. Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991)
(adopting a 50% approach for comparative negligence).
290. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987)
(quoting Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949)).
291. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note
304.
292. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
293. See supra text accompanying note 22, notes 57-58 and accompanying text for
further discussion of this problem in context of constitutional takings doctrine.
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of restrictions that, when considered collectively, cause more than a fifty
percent reduction in value, even though no single one of the restrictions would
cause such a reduction. Similarly, a land owner might subdivide his land in
anticipation of a regulatory restriction. Though these problems cannot be
eliminated, they could be addressed by the legislation involved. For example,
the incremental-regulatory-action problem could be addressed by treating
regulatory actions within some time frame, as if only a single regulatory limit
were involved. A similar time-based approachmightbe used in determining the
treatment of the land owner's actions in subdividing the tract.
(2) Limitations Based on Distinctions Among Regulatory
Schemes
Thus far, the substantive proposals considered in South Carolina treat all
regulatory takings equally. There has been no distinction between zoning vis-a-
vis environmental regulation or between different types of zoning decisions.294
One possible explanation for this approach is that, from a political perspective,
the broad-based application of the scheme to all regulation assists in building
coalitions. The approach also facilitates the drafting of a simple, clear, and
effective definition of a taking. If the statute distinguishes among regulatory
schemes in applying a takings scheme, it might be more complex and harder
to apply. Moreover, regulators might use the statutory distinctions to alter the
result in a particular case simply by changing the type of regulation involved.
However, the advantages of adopting a simple one-size-fits-all scheme may
be outweighed by the unfairness of ignoring important aspects of the real
world. Arguably, if there is a problem of clarity or fairness in terms of a
particular regulatory program, that problem should be addressed within the
context of that program.29s For example, if the South Carolina Coastal
Tidelands and Wetlands statutory provisions296 have problems in terms of their
impact on owners, these problems should be addressed by revising this
294. Rep. Harrison explained the rejection of an approach that would distinguish
among schemes when the House adopted South Carolina House Bill 3591 in 1997 as follows:
[T]here [were] amendments put up forhog farms, and
there [were] amendments put up for topless
establishments, [and] there [were] amendments put up
for this. We thought the concept was pure [that] either
it's a taking or it's not, and we couldn't pick and
choose... [and based upon that,] the decision was
made. You either believe in the concept ofindividual
property rights or you don't, and we would rather lose
the whole bill than just . . . start carving out
exceptions for this and thatjust to get support for the
bill.
Subcommittee Hearing Tape, supra note 222 (statement of Rep. Harrison).
295. See Sax, supra note 79, at 519 ("[W]here there are legitimate problems, let's
target the specifics with a focused solution.").
296. See S.C. CODEANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). This is the
statutory scheme at issue in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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statutory scheme, not by a total, broad-based revision of takings law.297
In drawing distinctions between regulatory schemes, it is perhaps most
important to keep in mind the ways that zoning differs from virtually all
environmental schemes. First, zoning is administered at the local level, and the
contents of the zoning ordinance are subject to the control of democratically
elected city and county councils. 98 Consequently, the system is more
responsive to the concerns of the residents affected by the decision involved.
Second, zoning is extremely flexible.299 Because of this flexibility, many
proposed procedural reforms are simply unnecessary in the zoning context.313
Third, many zoning disputes are, in effect, private disagreements among
neighbors. As indicated above, determining the right to a particular land use
for one parcel of property affects more than just that parcel's value; these
determinations also affect neighboring property values.3"' A scheme granting
new property rights to the parcel's owner, but not the neighbors, appears unfair
(and perhaps unconstitutional) in light of the fact that the value of the owner's
property might be increased at the expense of his immediate neighbors, not the
general public.302 Fourth, it is usually clear that an owner receives both benefits
and burdens from a zoning scheme.303 Because government exercise of the
police power often confers benefits on property owners and thus can increase
land values, it can be said that regulatory "givings" as well as takings occur.
These givings take many forms, including the value added to land from
infrastructure improvements like roads and sewer lines.
Regulatory givings are particularly common and direct in zoning. For
example, zoning, by itself, generally has the following positive effects on the
value of property in a residentially zoned district:
(1) If the property is zoned residential, the value of the property is
enhanced by the fact that the adjoining land is zoned residential.
(2) If the property is zoned commercial, the value is enhanced by the fact
that the zoning scheme limits the amount of land in the community
that can be used for commercial purpose. Because of this limiting
297. As an example of focused reform, the problem involved under the Act in Lucas,
505 U.S. 1003, has been ameliorated by a statutory variance procedure. Id. at 1010-11.
298. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-720(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997)
("[G]oveming body of a municipality or county may adopt a zoning ordinance .... "). The
ordinance is administered by citizen bodies appointed by the council. See S.C. CODEANN. §§ 6-
29-340 to -380 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) C" local planning commission"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
29-780 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (Board of Zoning Appeals); S.C. CODEANN. § 6-29-870 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1997) (Board of Architectural Review). The question of whether such localized
democratic control is good or bad is beyond the scope of this Article. The textual point is that
zoning is different because these councils (and the appointed persons on theboards and planning
commission) are responsive to citizens and to problems in ways that bureaucratic experts,
particularly those at a state office, are not.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 273-78.
300. H.R. 3591, 112th Leg., 1st Sess., § 28-4-80(A) (S.C. 1997) (as introduced Mar.
4, 1997) (see infra Appendix) (listing procedural approaches, including variances and special
exceptions).
301. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 91-92, 235 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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effect, the supply of commercial properties is reduced. If the demand
for commercial property is constant, this reduction in supply will
translate into higher purchase or rental value for commercially zoned
property. This effect may be stronger if the area nearby is zoned
residential because there will be less commercially zoned property in
that area.
(3) The zoning scheme as a whole will arguably enhance property values
as a whole by providing a more orderly and harmonious arrangement
of explicit land uses.
Zoning also has negative effects on property value. For example, a
rezoning of a parcel of land from commercial to residential reduces the value
of the parcel if commercial uses were a more valuable use of the parcel than
residential. However, part of the total value of the land before rezoning results
from the positive effects of the zoning scheme. These positive effects
complicate discussions of reduction in property values from
"downzoning"--i.e., from a change in zoning that reduces the permitted uses
or density.3 4 For example, if downzoning from commercial to residential
results in a loss in value of $10,000, should the owner be compensated for this
loss if most of the difference in value between commercial and residential
zoning for the parcel resulted from the second effect listed above-i.e., from
the scarcity in the amount of land in the community that can be used for
commercial purposes?
(3) Limitations Based on Balancing
A takings standard based on a loss of any or some minimum percentage of
property value has the advantage of clarity and relative ease of application.
However, these market value tests of takings are not necessarily fair. For
example, requiring compensation because aproperty's market value decreased
as a result of downzoning from commercial to residential use might be unfair
where: (1) the land owner never used the property for a commercial purpose,
(2) the property is an area that is virtually all residential in use, and (3) a
commercial use would substantially reduce other property values in the
immediate vicinity. In such a case, the owners of nearby land might argue that
any increased value from allowing a potential commercial use comes at their
expense. One might respond that these other owners purchased (or did not sell)
their land with knowledge that the parcel at issue was zoned for commercial
use. However, this argument is subject to the counterargument that they, and
the owner of the property at issue, also knew that the property could be
downzoned.
Because ofsuch problems, the advantages of flexible definitions should be
considered when drafting takings proposals that grant new substantive rights
304. See Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245,248-49 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting 1 JULIUS L. SACKMAN,NICHOLS ONEMINENTDOMAN § 1.42 (18] (a] [vi] (3d. ed. 1997)
("'Downsizing' is defined as '[t]he process by which zoning changes reduce an area's density
level or limit the intensity of (development on] designated land .... '").
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to land owners. This flexible approach would provide a way to balance the goal
of clarity with the goal of fairness. For example, the version of South Carolina
House Bill 3591 adopted by the House was arguably more flexible than a clear-
cut, loss-in-value scheme because it referred to a right to compensation if
property was "inordinately burdened.""3 5 The bill also contained other language
that appeared to grant flexibility because the right granted by the bill was
limited by phrases like "reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses
which are suitable for the subject real property and compatible with adjacent
land uses," 6 and like "[limits] that are unreasonable such that the property
owner bears a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the
public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large."3" 7 However,
the potential effect of this flexible language was negated by explicit language
that appeared to grant a right to compensation based on reduction in property
value. 03 Moreover, because of the way South Carolina House Bill 3591 is
drafted, it is very difficult to understand or apply these phrases. For example,
is compatibility with adjacent land uses to be judged by a common law
nuisance standard or by a more flexible, zoning-like standard? Nevertheless,
the quoted phrases indicate the type of language that, if placed in a clear, well-
drafted statute, could grant courts discretion to be flexible while guiding them
in the exercise of that discretion.
b. Limitation ofAmount ofLiability Should Be Considered
Thus far, reform proposals have taken a completely property-oriented
approach and viewed the scheme as if it were a form of eminent domain. This
approach is consistent with the underlying property rights basis of the takings
reform movement. 9 However, this approach provides no limit on the liability
of the regulating entity. An alternative approach is to view the scheme as a type
of statutory tort. From this perspective, the "injury" to the owner-loss in
property value as a result of regulation-is treated in the same way as any other
tortious property injury.310
This tort approach has several advantages. It should be preferred by local
governments because liability would be limited by the South Carolina Tort
Claims Act3  or by some maximum dollar amount set by the takings bill
305. H.R. 3591, 112th Leg., 1st Sess. § 28-4-30(A) (S.C. 1997) (as adoptedby House
on May 28, 1997).
306. Id. § 28-4-30(3)(2).
307. Id. § 28-4-30(B)(5).
308. See supra text accompanying notes 170-73.
309. See supra Part III.A.
310. Cf. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
andInalienability: One View ofthe Cathedral, 85 HARv.L. REV. 1089,1089 (1972) (noting that
ownership rights can be protected by either "property rules" or by "liability rules").
311. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120(a)(1)-(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (placing
limits of $250,000 per claim and $500,000 per occurrence, except for malpractice, where limits
are $1,000,000 per claim and per occurrence).
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itself.312 In addition, an insurance type fund could be established to cover
liability for this new tort. This would not only provide a way to fund payments
for "tortious takings," but also serve as a means for gathering data about the
impact of the new tort in terms of numbers and costs of claims. Another
advantage of this approach is that it focuses recovery on "little people," who
are more likely to receive full compensation within the liability limits, rather
than large developers or large industrial or agricultural uses.3" 3
c. Local Governments Without Zoning Must Be Addressed
One problem with adopting a new substantive takings right to
compensation in South Carolina is that many counties currently have no
zoning. 4 Many smaller municipalities also lack zoning.3"' The initial adoption
of zoning in these areas will present problems if a statutory takings bill requires
compensation for reduction in property value, even if the right is limited in
some way. Local governments that now lack zoning will be faced with a
choice: (1) adopt zoning and pay property owners who suffer a devaluation
caused by zoning restrictions, or (2) continue without zoning. Given taxpayer
resistance to tax increases, the second choice is likely to prevail.
One solution to this problem would be to adopt legislation requiring that
all counties and incorporated cities adopt zoning by some date, for example, by
June 1, 2001. Such a requirement is necessary because the current zoning act
merely authorizes cities and counties to adopt zoning in a particular manner by
312. The potentially unlimited liability was a concern expressed by opponents ofH.R.
3591. Robert Nash, Chairman of the Pickens County Council, argued:
Under this legislation, there is no limit to
the liability. When the state decided to waive
sovereign immunity a few years ago, it did so
advisably. And it set caps on the amount of money
due to litigants even in the most extreme cases of
negligence or in injury and even in death. This bill is
a no holes barred attack on the county's financial
resources regardless of the county planners' good or
ill intent.
... Regardless of the [dollar] numbers
attached to these bills, the costs born by the counties
will be unlimited, it will be uninsured, and it will be
uninsurable. Ajudgment against Pickens County will
impair its credit rating and judgments will be passed
off in the following year's budgets.
Subcommittee Hearing Tape, supra note 222 (statement of Bob Nash).
313. See Treanor, supra note 132, at 1164-65 (noting that narratives concerning loss
of homes and substantial portions of "small person's" wealth have power in cultural norms of
fairness).
314. See supra note 232.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss1/5
TAKINGS REFORM
May 3, 1999.316 This enabling act, like prior enabling acts in South Carolina,
317
does not require local governments to adopt zoning.3 s However, requiring
local governments to adopt zoning would raise new problems. For some
counties, zoning seems unnecessary. For example, eight counties have less than
twenty thousand residents.39 Do these small, rural counties need the things
required for zoning such as a comprehensive land use plan, a planning
commission, and a zoning board of adjustment?32° Another problem is funding
the cost of drafting a comprehensive zoning plan and administering a zoning
scheme. Obviously, such an unfunded mandate would present political and
practical problems because many of the poorer, rural counties have trouble
enough funding adequate schools. How would they fund this new zoning
requirement? Nevertheless, without a legislatively imposed requirement, many
areas of the state could remain without zoning for years. Consequently, the
dilemma of choosing between zoning and compensation will remain.
An alternative approach would be to defer the application of a takings
reform act in any city or county without zoning until after a comprehensive
zoning scheme has been adopted.32' One problem with this approach is the
resulting inequality in applying the right to compensation. However, some
inequality is unavoidable. IfSouth Carolina adopted a state-wide compensation
316. South Carolina Local Government Comprehensive Planning Enabling Act of
1994, No. 355, § 2, 1994 S.C. Acts 4010,4036 (1994) (repealing prior acts, effective five years
from approval of Act No. 355 on May 3, 1994, and requiring all "local planning programs...
[to] be in conformity" with the Act's provisions after that date).
317. See S.C. CODEANN. § 6-7-330 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (providing thatimunicipalities
and counties "may exercise" powers granted under the chapter).
318. Cf S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-720(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) ("[G]overning
body of a municipality or county may adopt a zoning ordinance .... ).
319. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICAL SERvs., S.C. STATE BUDGET AND
CONTROL BD., S.C. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 331 (1994) (noting that in 1990, Allendale and
Calhoun Counties had populations of less than fifteen thousand, and McCormick County had less
than ten thousand).
320. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-29-510,-720(A),-780 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997)
(requiring a planning process, zoning districts, and a board ofzoning appeals as a part ofzoning
scheme).
321. The approach of postponing effect in areas without zoning was rejected when
the House adopted H.R. 3591, 112th Leg., Ist Sess. (S.C. 1997) (as adopted by House on May
28, 1997). Rep. Harrison indicated that the reason for this rejection was:
If you wait until everybody has every land use plan
... those plans ... can in fact have a takings impact.
So, if you wait until after every land use plan and
every zone is in effect, you're basically saying go
ahead and take a free shot at us because we won't
have a claim until after you finish.
Subcommittee Hearing Tape, supra note 222 (statement of Rep. Harrison).
An additional problem is that local governments have broad police powers granted by
statute. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); cf S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 7
("No laws for a specific county shall be enacted and no county shall be exempted from the
general laws or laws applicable to the selected alternative form of government."). Arguably,
these powers include the ability to enact zoning-like laws that affect land use without having a
complete zoning system. For example, a county might argue that it has the power to impose
restrictions on hog farming to protect the public health and welfare, even if the county has not
adopted a comprehensive zoning scheme as required by the state zoning enabling act.
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requirement, local governments that currently have zoning could maintain
existing zoning restrictions without paying compensation, while local
governments without zoning could not adopt equivalent zoning restrictions
without paying compensation. Proponents of reform are also concerned that
postponement of effectiveness in areas without zoning will allow these
governmentl units to adopt restrictive schemes knowing that the initial
adoption will avoid compensation payouts and that future changes will be
subject to a right to compensation. Arguably, the zoning classifications and
restrictions at the time of initial adoption might deliberately be very restrictive
in order to provide the local governments with increased flexibility in the
future. This incentive to initially adopt restrictive zoning results because
changes to less restrictive zoning are unlikely to result in a statutory takings
claim in the way that a change to more restrictive zoning would. However,
these counties desire investment and economic growth and deliberately
restrictive zoning might hinder this development. Moreover, similar incentives
already exist without a statutory takings bill. Under the present scheme, if an
entity initially adopts a deliberately overrestrictive zoning scheme, planning
regulators can "bargain" with developers by exchanging a reduction in zoning
restrictions for public amenities that could not have been required by law."
VI. CONCLUSION-LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN CONTEXT OF A NATIONAL
REFORM MOVEMENT
Takings reform can be viewed as another chapter in a long-term struggle
between two competing groups-regulators versus the regulated and
environmentalists versus developers and industrialists. Each side has a
particular world view, and the sides disagree about what is fair, just, efficient,
or otherwise desirable. Consistent with its view, one side favors regulation for
the public good while the other side opposes it. One side adopts a "rhetoric of
responsibility," while the other side uses a "rhetoric of rights." The merits of
the respective sides' positions are beyond the scope of this Article. The point
is not that one side or the other is right. Instead, the point is that one can better
understand property rights reform by seeing it as a part of this broader struggle.
From this perspective, property rights reform is simply another tactic
adopted by one side in its broader struggle to lessen the impact of regulation.
In this context, the basic goal of reform is always to lessen regulatory
restrictions. This goal may be articulated in terms of other goals and
values-such as rights, fairness, or efficiency. However, these other goals and
values often serve simply as rhetoric to further the fundamental goal of
lessening regulation.
Because this ongoing struggle is national in scope, the property rights
movement is also national in scope. However, it can be very misleading to
think that the movement is only about rights. It is also about regulation in itself.
The most irksome regulations are federal, not state. Yet state property rights
322. See, e.g., Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rulesfor an Old Game?,
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reform has no effect on these federal programs. Nevertheless, the states provide
a forum for adopting limitations on state regulation as well as for symbolic
attacks on all regulation. It is also misleading to think that the national
movement shares any goals more specific than the desire to reduce regulation.
More specific goals might be identified as a matter of tactics, but these specific
goals become less clear and less important as the legislative reform
"movement" expands across the country and develops into a local struggle in
each state. As a result, the "property rights reform movement" has resulted in
very different scenarios in different states."
Consistent with this pattern, South Carolina has had its own reform story.
South Carolina has its own unique circumstances, including a deeply rooted
conservative resistance to government in general and to planning bureaucrats
in particular. This conservatism conflicts with the need to balance rapid
population growth and development with the desire to maintain a small town,
small state "feel." This conservative resistence to government also conflicts
with concerns like protecting sensitive, relatively unspoiled coastal areas and
maintaining an irreplaceable historical heritage. Resolving this conflict must
be addressed in the midst of a political struggle between a recently vibrant
Republican party and a Democratic party which has lost its traditional
dominance. In short, South Carolina is different from Florida, and it is not
surprising that the bill that was adopted with overwhelming support in Florida
has had trouble in South Carolina. Indeed, all of the reform proposals
considered thus far have had trouble in South Carolina. This difficulty does not
mean that the push for reform will end. As indicated above, the movement is
likely to continue. The point is that even though the push for change in South
Carolina is part of a "national movement," the result, whatever it may be,
should be and will be unique to South Carolina.
323. See supra Part LI.B.1.
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APPENDIX
PROPERTY RIGHTS BILLS CONSIDERED
BY THE SOUTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE
1. Senate Bill 121 (introduced Jan. 10, 1995)
A BILL
TO ENACT THE "SOUTH CAROLINA PRIVATE PROPERTY
PROTECTION ACT."
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:
SECTION 1. This act is known and may be cited as the "South Carolina
Private Property Protection Act."
SECTION 2. (A) Whenever implementation by the State or any of its political
subdivisions of any regulatory program or law operates to reduce the fair
market value of real property to less than fifty percent of its fair market value
for the uses permitted at the time the owner acquired the title, or January 1,
1996, whichever is later, the property is deemed to have been taken for the use
of the public. These regulatory programs include, but are not limited to, land
use planning or zoning programs.
(B) The owner or user has the right to require condemnation by and just
compensation from the governmental unit, or units, when more than one
governmental unit is involved, imposing the regulation or law resulting in
decreased value, or to receive compensation for the reduction in value caused
by government action, and in either case to have the just compensation
determined by a jury. When more than one governmental unit is involved, the
court shall determine the proportion each unit is required to contribute to the
compensation.
(C) The compensation must be for the full value of the interest taken or for the
full amount of the decrease in fair market value and may not be limited to the
amount by which the decrease in fair market value exceeds fifty percent.
(D) Governmental units subject to the provisions of this act may not make
waiver of the provisions of this act a condition for approval of the use of real
property or the issuance of any permit or other entitlement. Plaintiffs may
accept an approval of use, permit, or other entitlement granted by the
governmental unit without compromising their rights under this act if:
(1) a vritten reservation of rights is made at the time of acceptance of the
authorization, permit, or other entitlement; or
(2) an oral statement is made before the governmental unit granting the
authorization, permit, or other entitlement at a public meeting at which the
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governmental unit renders its decision.
(E) The owner may make his reservation in either or both forms.
SECTION 3. No compensation is required by virtue of this act if the regulatory
program or law is an exercise of the police power to prevent uses noxious in
fact, or to prevent demonstrable harm, to the health and safety of the public. A
use is deemed a noxious use if, and only if, it amounts to a public nuisance in
fact. Determination by the governmental unit or units involved that a use is a
noxious use or poses a demonstrable harm to public health and safety is not
binding upon the court. Review of the governmental unit's, or units',
determination is de novo.
SECTION 4. (A) The statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to this
act is the statute of limitations for ordinary actions brought for injuries to real
property. The statute of limitations begins to run upon the final administrative
decision implementing the regulatory program affecting a plaintiff s property.
This statute of limitations applies to any claim which may be brought pursuant
to any other provision of law.
(B) A law or program is implemented with respect to an owner's property when
actually applied to that property unless the enactment of the law or program by
itself operates to reduce the fair market value of the real property, or any legally
recognized interest in the real property, to less than fifty percent of its fair
market value for the uses permitted at the time the owner acquired title, or
January 1, 1996, whichever is later, without further governmental action and
the program contains no provision allowing for relief from the program's
operation.
(C) This act applies not only to new regulatory programs but also to the
application of regulatory programs in effect on the effective date of this act,
including, but not limited to, land use laws or zoning laws and regulations
regarding the owner's property.
SECTION 5. (A) If the governmental unit which is found to have inversely
condemned the property is unwilling or unable to pay the costs awarded, it may
instead relax the land use planning, zoning, or other regulatory program as it
affects the plaintiff's land and all similarly situated land in the jurisdiction in
which the regulatory program is in effect, to the level of regulation in place as
of the time the owner acquired title or January 1, 1996, whichever is later. In
that event, the governmental unit is liable to the plaintiff landowner for the
reasonable and necessary costs of the inverse condemnation action, plus any
actual and demonstrable economic losses caused the plaintiff by the regulation
during the period in which it was in effect.
(B) This section does not affect any remedy which is constitutionally required.
(C) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the governmental unit or units
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subject to an award of compensation under this act may elect to relax the land
use planning, zoning, or other regulatory program without further public
hearing or proceedings or environmental review. If the governmental unit or
units elect to so relax the affected regulatory program, the previously effective
program is automatically in effect.
(D) Any permit, authorization, or other entitlement granted under a program
rolled back pursuant to this section continues to be valid, notwithstanding any
provision of law in the program reinstated by the rollback.
SECTION 6. Nothing in this act may be construed to preclude property owners
from bringing legal challenges to regulatory programs affected by this act in
instances where the diminution in value of the property or the use of the
property causedby the regulatory programs does not exceed fifty percent of fair
market value for the uses permitted at the time the owner acquired title, or
January 1, 1996, whichever is later. This act also may not be construed to
preclude property owners from bringing legal challenges to regulatory
programs affected by this act based on other provisions of law.
SECTION 7. This act takes effect January 1, 1996.
2. Senate Bill 374 (introduced Jan. 17, 1995)
A BILL
TO AMEND TITLE 28, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976,
RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN BY ADDING CHAPTER 13 SO AS
TO ENACT THE "SOUTH CAROLINA PRIVATE PROPERTY
PROTECTION ACT OF 1995" INCLUDING PROVISIONS PROVIDING
THAT COMPENSATION MUST BE PAID UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS AS A RESULT OF REGULATIONS OR ACTIONS BY
STATE AGENCIES SUBSTANTIALLY INTERFERING WITH OR
TAKING PRIVATE PROPERTY, REQUIRING AGENCIES TO CREATE
GUIDELINES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS A TAKING,
PROVIDING FOR AN ASSESSMENT TO BE MADE BEFORE THE
ACTION IS TAKEN, AND PROVIDING FOR EMERGENCIES WHEN
HEALTH AND SAFETY IS AN ISSUE.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:
SECTION 1. Title 28 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"CHAPTER 13
Private Property Protection Act
Section 28-13-10. This chapter is known and may be cited as the 'South
Carolina Private Property Protection Act of 1995.'
[Vol. SO: 93
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Section 28-13-20. As used in this chapter:
(A) 'Constitutional taking' or 'taking' means due to a governmental action
private property is taken such that compensation to the owner of the property
is required by either;
(1) the fifth or fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United
States; or
(2) Article 1, Section 13 of the Constitution of this State.
(B) (1) 'Governmental action' or 'action' means:
(a) proposed regulations and emergency regulations by a state agency
that if adopted and enforced may limit the use of private property
unless its provisions are in accordance with applicable state or federal
provisions of law;
(b) proposed or implemented licensing or permitting conditions,
requirements, or limitations to the use of private property unless its
provisions are in accordance with applicable state or federal provisions
of law or the regulations applicable thereto;
(c) required dedications or exactions from owners of private property;
or
(d) provisions or law on the regulations applicable thereto.
(2) 'Governmental action' or 'action' does not mean:
(a) activity in which the power of eminent domain is exercised
formally;
(b) repealing regulations discontinuing governmental programs or
amending regulations in a manner that lessens interference with the
use of private property;
(c) law enforcement activity involving seizure or forfeiture of private
property for violations of law or as evidence in criminal proceedings;
(d) orders and enforcement actions that are issued by a state agency or
a court of law in accordance with applicable federal or state provisions
of law.
(C) 'Private property' means any real or personal property in this State that is
protected by either the fifth or fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the
United States or Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of this State.
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(D) 'State agency' means an officer, entity, or department of state government
that is authorized by law to promulgate regulations. State agency does not
include the legislative or judicial branches of state government.
Section 28-13-30. (A) Each state agency shall adopt guidelines to assist them
in the identification of actions that have constitutional taking implications.
(B) In creating the guidelines, the state agency shall take into consideration
recent court rulings on the taking of private property.
(C) The state agency shall complete the guidelines on or before July 1, 1995,
and review and update the guidelines annually to maintain consistency with
court rulings.
Section 28-13-40. (A) Using the guidelines prepared under Section 28-13-30,
each state agency shall:
(1) determine whether an action has constitutional taking implications; and
(2) prepare an assessment of constitutional taking implications that
includes an analysis of the following:
(a) the likelihood that the action may result in a constitutional taking,
including a description of how the taking affects the use or value of
private property;
(b) alternatives to the proposed action that may:
(i) fulfill the government's legal obligations of the state agency;
(ii) reduce the impact on the private property owner; and
(iii) reduce the risk of a constitutional taking;
(c) an estimate of financial cost to the State for compensation and the
source ofpaymentwithinthe agency's budget ifa constitutional taking
is determined.
(B) In addition to the guidelines prepared under Section 28-13-30, each state
agency shall adhere, to the extent permitted by law, to the following criteria if
implementing or enforcing actions that have constitutional taking implications:
(1) If an agency requires a person to obtain a permit for a specific use of
private property, any conditions imposed on issuing the permit shall
directly relate to the purpose for which the permit is issued and shall
substantially advance that purpose.
(2) Any restriction imposed on the use of private property must be
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proportionate to the extent the use contributes to the overall problem that
the restriction is to redress.
(3) If an action involves a permitting process or any other decision-making
process that will interfere with, or otherwise prohibit, the use of private
property pending the completion of the process, the duration of the process
must be kept to the minimum necessary.
(4) Before taking an action restricting private property use for the
protection of public health or safety, the state agency, in internal
deliberative documents, shall:
(a) clearly identify, with as much specificity as possible, the public
health or safety risk created by the private property use;
(b) establish that the action substantially advances the purpose of
protecting public health and safety against the specifically identified
risk;
(c) establish, to the extent possible, that the restrictions imposed on the
private property are proportionate to the extent the use contributes to
the overall risk; and
(d) estimate, to the extent possible, the potential cost to the State or
local government if a court determines that the action constitutes a
constitutional taking.
(C) If there is an immediate threat to health and safety that constitutes an
emergency and requires an immediate response, the analysis required by item
(B)(2) of this section may be made when the response is completed.
(D) Before the state agency implements an action that has constitutional taking
implications, the state agency shall submit a copy of the assessment of
constitutional taking implications to the State Budget and Control Board."
SECTION 2. This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor.
3. House Bill 3790 (introduced Mar. 4, 1995; companion bill: S.839
(introduced May 16, 1995))
A BILL
TO AMEND TITLE 28, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976,
RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN, BY ADDING CHAPTER 4 SO AS
TO ENACT "THE SOUTH CAROLINA PROPERTY RIGHTS ACT."
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:
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SECTION 1. Title 28 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"Chapter 4
The South Carolina Property Rights Act
Section 28-4-10. This chapter may be cited as 'The South Carolina Property
Rights Act' and any references to the term 'act', unless the context clearly
indicates otherwise, mean the South Carolina Property Rights Act.
Section 28-4-20. As used in this chapter and as used in the South Carolina
Eminent Domain Procedure Act, Title 28, Chapter 2, when made applicable by
this act:
(A) Except as otherwise specified, the words defined in the Eminent Domain
Procedure Act shall have the meanings defined therein.
(B) 'Government entity' means:
(1) the General Assembly or a board, authority, commission, council,
committee, department, office, officer, individual, or agency in the
executive branch of state government;
(2) a political subdivision of the State; and
(3) a special purpose district.
(C) 'Interest in real property' includes any rights to the use of property which
may be limited through regulation by a governmental entity.
COMMENTS
Takings jurisprudence traditionally has recognized that compensation is due for
what the property owner has lost, rather than what the condemning authority
gains. With respect to the acquisition of a fee interest in real property, it is thus
well established that valuation of the property must be based upon the status of
the property in the owners' hands before the taking or acquisition occurs. Much
recent litigation has centered on the question of whether a regulation on the use
of property represents a taking of property in the constitutional sense that
would require compensation. This definition explicitly provides that under state
law any right to use property which may be limited through regulation
constitutes an interest in real property. The phrase 'interest in real property' is
dravm directly from the eminent domain statute. Thus, the proposed legislation
operates principally by bringing regulatory actions within the scope of that
statute.
(D) 'Acquire' as used in various forms referring to acquisition of an interest in
real property or of property rights includes any enactment or enforcement of a
[Vol. 50: 93
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regulation that has the effect of limiting or extinguishing any existing right to
use real property by an owner, whether or not such regulation involves the
physical appropriation or invasion of real property, and whether or not such
regulation transfers such right to use to a governmental entity.
COMMENTS
The broad definition of 'acquire' in this act reflects the notion referred to above
that the emphasis in takings jurisprudence is on what is lost by the property
owner, rather than what is gained by the condemning authority. By defining
'acquire' broadly, the act brings all regulatory acts within the scope of the
eminent domain statute, which otherwise might be narrowly read to include
only those acquisitions which result in the passing of title to the State.
(E) 'Condemn' includes the acquisition of an interest in real property by
governmental entities through regulation.
COMMENTS
This definition serves to clarify the broadened scope of the eminent domain
statute. In the past, condemnation was generally regarded as a process
applicable only when the State acquired a fee interest in property or the
equivalent. Because the effect of regulation may also require compensation, the
same process, condemnation, should be used in the case of land use regulation.
(F) 'Investment' as used in the expression 'investment backed expectations'
includes the:
(1) giving of value for the acquisition of property;
(2) giving of value to maintain, improve, or retain ownership of property;
(3) decision not to sell an interest in real property in the expectation of
future use or sale; and
(4) giving of value to develop or improve adjacent property.
COMMENTS
A line of constitutional cases has recognized that one of the factors to be
considered in determining whether compensation is required for a taking is the
reasonable investment backed expectations of the owner. See 'Penn Central'.
In subsection (1) 'the giving of value for the acquisition of property' represents
the most obvious instance in which the owner has paid a specific sum in
expectation of future use of the property. In actuality, there are other situations
as well in which a property owner has a legitimate investment made in reliance
on future use of property which should be taken into account in determining the
right to compensation. Subsection (2) refers to investments made by an owner
after the original time of acquisition. In subsection (3) 'the decision not to sell
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an interest in real property...' addresses the situation in which a landowner
may not expend funds on property, but elects to forego short term gains
through liquidation of the property in reliance on long-term appreciation in
value. It is a matter of economic reality that the decision to hold property over
a period of time and to pass up an opportunity to liquidate it may often
represent a conscious investment decision. In subsection (4) 'the giving of
value to develop or improve adjacent property' recognizes that individual
parcels of land may not be viewed in isolation, and that funds spent to improve
one tract of land may actually represent an investment benefiting other adjacent
property.
(G) 'Nuisance' refers to unreasonable, unwarranted, or unlawful use of
property, as traditionally recognized in the common law, and is limited to those
uses whose prohibition inheres in the title to the property and which use could
be enjoined by adjacent landowners or other uniquely affected persons, or by
the State under its power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally.
COMMENTS
This definition tracks the treatment of nuisance law in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). In that case, Justice Scalia reconciled
the power of the State to control and abate nuisances without compensation
with the constitutional requirement for payment of just compensation by
explaining that preexisting nuisance law should be recognized as, basically, an
element of value. To the extent that use of a property is already limited by
nuisance law, the 'property's value would be similarly limited, and no
compensation would be required for regulation affecting those same uses. On
the other hand, newly created limitations on use cannot be exempted from the
compensation requirement merely by characterizing them as nuisances.
(H) 'Regulation' includes:
(1) All land use regulation, rules or emergency rules, statutes, ordinances,
dedications, or denials of permits, licenses, authorizations, or other
governmental permission if such denial is without cause or if such denial
is with cause but is based upon selective enforcement of any statute,
regulation, or standard; any of which has the effect of limiting or imposing
conditions upon the owner's rights to use or occupy property.
(2) The following actions are not included in the definition of 'regulation':
(a) exercise of the power of eminent domain to physically appropriate
real property or to effect the physical invasion of real property;
(b) the repeal or amendment of a statute, rule, ordinance, requirement,
or other action if the repeal or amendment qualifies, lessens, or
reverses a limitation or restriction on the use of private property;
(Vol. 50: 93
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(c) a state governmental action specifically mandated by a federal
governmental authority, to the extent that the state action does not
result from the exercise of legislative, executive, or administrative
discretion;
(d) law enforcement activity involving the seizure or forfeiture of
private property for a violation of law or as evidence in a criminal
proceeding;
(e) any regulation which would otherwise be included in this
definition, to the extent that it does not affect existing property rights,
or clarifies, restates, or otherwise imposes restrictions on property use
which were already in effect before the enactment of such regulation;
provided, however, that when such a regulation imposes new or
broader restrictions, to that extent such regulation is subject to the
provisions of this chapter; and further provided that exemptions
created by this section shall not serve to limit or extinguish any rights
or causes of action resulting from prior regulation.
COMMENTS
Subsection (1) defines regulation as broadly as possible. The only exceptions
to this broad definition are those exemptions specifically identified in
subsection (2). Clause (a), the physical appropriation of real property, refers to
actions which would require compensation under the existing eminent domain
statute. This exemption is included here so as to avoid affecting existing law
pertaining to physical appropriation of property by the enactment of this act,
which addresses other forms of government action. Clause (b) explicitly allows
the State to relax regulations without triggering the need for compensation
under this action. Presumably, existing zoning legislation and jurisprudence is
better suited to address problems created by down-zoning and similar
regulatory actions. Clause (c) is a narrow exemption which applies only to
those regulatory actions which the State may be required to take by the federal
government in which the State plays no significant decision-making role. In
such instances, the federal government probably should be regarded as the true
taking authority, and the state's purely ministerial actions would not fall within
the scope of this act. This exemption does not remove from the scope of the act
those state actions which are taken in compliance with a federally-mandated
program when the General Assembly, executive, or administrative branch of
the state government take part in the decision-making process in shaping the
regulation or enforcing it. Clause (d) involves seizure and forfeiture of property
which is governed by other law. Obviously, exemption from this act does not
imply that improperly seized property may not be recovered or require
compensation under other applicable law. Clause (e) is a savings clause
protecting both the State and property owners. It allows legislation to be
redrafted and clarified without giving rise to any new compensation
requirement, except to the extent that further restrictions on property are
created. On the other hand, in like manner the reenactment of regulation cannot
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serve to cut off any preexisting rights for compensation on the part of the
property owner.
Section 28-4-30. (A) The General Assembly declares the basic state policies
further by this chapter to be the recognition that land use regulation may
constitute a constitutional taking requiring compensation, and the requirement
that governmental entities follow similar procedures with respect to acquisition
of property rights through regulation as they are required to follow for the
physical appropriation of real property under the Eminent Domain Procedure
Act.
(B) Specific policies to be promoted through the implementation of this chapter
are to:
(1) provide uniform procedures for the acquisition of all property rights by
governmental entities, both through regulation and physical appropriation;
(2) reduce costly litigation which may be caused by inverse condemnation
claims arising from the implementation of regulations;
(3) provide for the development and use of administrative procedures to
compensate landowners for loss of property rights resulting from land use
regulation;
(4) assist governmental entities in planning and budgeting for state
programs which involve the regulation of land use;
(5) provide for the efficient use of state resources in the achievement of
state objectives involving land use regulation;
(6) maximize the results of desirable regulation through cost control,
informed planning, and the avoidance of after the fact litigation;
(7) provide explicit guidelines for governmental entities involved in land
use regulation;
(8) protect the property rights of landowners and to provide for
compensation for the taking of those property rights through regulation.
COMMENTS
The overall purpose of this act is to provide a specific statutory right to
compensation for state regulation of land use so as to eliminate the need for
litigation based on constitutional takings. While this act is based on the
constitutional requirement for payment ofjust compensation when property is
taken for public use, the word 'taking' is not used anywhere in the act except
in this policy statement and the policy statement in Section VI. By 'defining
interest in real property' to include rights to use which may be limited by
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regulation, the act may create a property right under state law which would
clarify property owners' rights with respect to the constitutional requirement
for the payment ofjust compensation. However, the primary purpose of the act
is to create a process for the payment of compensation when land use
regulation causes an economic impact upon property owners, without requiring
the litigation of constitutional issues. Under the act, it is not necessary for a
property owner to prove that a constitutional taking has occurred; rather, as
noted in Section VIII, the right to compensation will arise whenever an
appraisal in accordance with this act indicates that a regulation has caused a
substantial diminution in the total value of the real property. The simplest way
to achieve this end, and the method chosen by this act, is to bring regulatory
actions of the State within the scope of the eminent domain statute. Subsection
(B) identifies some of the specific policies promoted by the act. Clause (1)
refers to the fact that the legislature and state agencies should use the same
procedures with respect to regulation of land use as they were previously
required to use for the physical appropriation of land of property under the
eminent domain statute. Clause (2) recognizes the fact that, in the absence of
this action, property owners are forced to seek compensation for regulatory
takings through inverse condemnation claims. This results in costly litigation,
as well as, in many instances, damage awards which could be avoided by
following the normal condemnation procedures. Clause (3) reiterates the
concept that landowners should be compensated for what they lose without
respect to the benefit, if any, accruing to the State by any regulation. Clause (4)
extends to the regulatory arena the same principles which have been applicable
under preexisting condemnation law. Under existing law, when the enactment
of regulation only gives rise to state expense after affected property owners
bring inverse condemnation actions, agencies are unable to budget intelligently
for the cost of the regulations they enact. The result is that often regulations are
enacted with the belief that the cost will be minimal, and years later it may be
discovered that the total cost of litigation and damages has been substantial, at
which time the regulations may even be rescinded. Clause (5) recognizes that
state resources are limited, and that only with the informed planning and
budgeting referred to in Clause (4) may these limited resources be effectively
allocated. By engaging in a condemnation process for the regulation of
property similar to that applicable for physical appropriation, agencies are
required to estimate the cost of any program before going forward with it. Any
regulations which would be unusually costly may be identified in advance. In
that way, the optimum results may be achieved for the lowest cost possible.
Clause (6) similarly recognizes that the costs of desirable regulation may be
best controlled by advance planning. Clause (7) recognizes that regulatory
agencies have traditionally been given broad discretion to implement state
programs without any guidance or requirement to consider the economic
impact of the regulations upon property owners. Clause (8) recognizes that the
underlying purpose of the act is to provide for compensation when property
rights are taken through regulation.
Section 28-4-40. Not later than January 1, 1996, all executive governmental
entities which administer or issue land use regulations shall adopt regulations
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and internal procedures for the implementation of the policies contained in this
chapter.
COMMENTS
This section is necessary to ensure that state agencies affirmatively incorporate
the procedures required by the act into their internal procedures.
Section 284-50. (A) Before the adoption or enforcement of regulations
affecting land use, governmental entities shall, consistent with the guidelines
established by this act, assess the proposed regulation or proposed manner of
enforcing such regulation, and prepare a written assessment which states the
following findings:
(1) the specific purpose of the proposed regulation;
(2) the probable effect of the proposed action on the use and value of
private property, including an evaluation of the probable cost of acquisition
of an interest in that property through enactment or enforcement of the
regulation;
(3) alternatives to the proposed action that may lessen the effect on private
property or which may involve lower probable costs to the State;
(4) an estimate of the cost to the governmental entity including the cost of
acquisition of property rights through regulation; and
(5) the source of payment within the governmental entity's budget for such
compensation.
(B) If there is an immediate threat to health and safety that constitutes an
emergency and requires immediate action, the assessment required under this
section may be postponed until the action is completed.
(C) The governmental entity shall deliver copies of this assessment to the
Governor, appropriate financial management authority, and the Attorney
General.
COMMENTS
This section similarly requires affirmative action on the part of agencies
adopting land use regulations. In the absence of such requirements, it would be
easier for agencies to continue existing practices, forcing property owners to
bring inverse condemnation claims. The whole purpose of this act is to
encourage all regulatory agencies to engage in advance planning.
Section 284-60. To the extent reasonably possible, governmental entities shall
avoid adopting or enforcing regulations in a manner that constitutes a taking of
[Vol. 50: 93
74
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss1/5
TAKINGS REFORM
property requiring the payment of just compensation in accordance with the
Constitution of this State or of the United States or which would require
compensation under the provisions of this chapter.
COMMENTS
This policy statement derives from Executive Order 12630, issued by Ronald
Reagan March 15, 1988, (53 F.R. 8859). Similar policy statements have been
repeated in a variety of regulatory acts on the federal and state levels. See 49
C.F.R. Section 24.8 (1992); 3 C.F.R. 555 (1989); S.C. Code Ann. Section
48-39-30(C) (1987).
Section 28-4-70. In all cases in which it appears likely that the adoption or
enforcement of a regulation may give rise to a right to compensation under the
Constitution of this State or of the United States, under the common law of this
State, under the statutes of this State, or under the provisions of this chapter, the
proposed regulation must be treated as an acquisition of an interest in real
property under the Eminent Domain Procedure Act, and the governmental
entity shall proceed to condemn that interest in real property in accordance with
the provisions of the Eminent Domain Procedure Act.
COMMENTS
This section explicitly brings regulatory takings into the condemnation process
under the Eminent Domain Procedure Act. The existing procedures under the
Eminent Domain Procedure Act are well tailored to fairly resolve the issues
arising from condemnation, whether it involves physical appropriation or land
use regulation, and there is no need to create a separate set of procedures to
deal with regulatory actions.
Section 28-4-80. Any regulation of real property gives rise to a right to
compensation when an appraisal or other valuation pursuant to this chapter or
the Eminent Domain Procedure Act indicates a substantial diminution of the
total value of the real property resulting from the regulation.
COMMENTS
This section creates an explicit right to compensation when regulation of real
property results in a substantial diminution of the total value of the property.
The amount of such a diminution would be determined through appraisal. No
specific formula for determining what constitutes a 'substantial diminution' is
provided, because no formula could adequately address all of the various
situations in which compensation would be appropriate. The right to
compensation must therefore be determined on a case-to-case basis.
Section 28-4-90. (A) For the purposes of this chapter, in appraising property
rights which may be acquired through land use regulation, in accordance with
the procedures set forth in the Eminent Domain Procedure Act, the following
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additional factors must be taken into account:
(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner;
(2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct
investment-backed expectations;
(3) the character of the regulation;
(4) the present use of the property and of adjacent property;
(5) the probable future use of the property;
(6) the extent to which the use of the property is already limited by other
regulations, nuisance law, and the use of adjacent property;
(7) the extent to which remaining uses of the property are economically
viable;
(8) any economic benefit to the property as a result of the proposed
regulation;
(9) the existence of any liens or encumbrances on the property, and the
extent to which claims secured by such liens or encumbrances on the
property before the regulation exceed the extent to which such claims are
secured by liens or encumbrances on the property subject to the regulation.
(B) The fact that a property owner paid taxes based upon a particular valuation
or use is not relevant to the valuation of property or an interest in property for
the purposes of this chapter; however, in the event that compensation is
awarded based upon an anticipated change in valuation or use, payment of the
compensation must be equivalent to a sale or change in use for tax purposes
and the property may be subject to such tax rollbacks as would otherwise be
effective in the event of such a sale or change in use.
COMMENTS
This section identifies additional factors which should be taken into account in
appraising property taken through regulation in accordance with the general
procedures created under the eminent domain statute. Subsection (A) requires
that the following additional factors be considered: Clause (1), the economic
impact of the regulation on the property owner, ties the property owner's right
to compensation to the actual economic realities pertaining to the property in
question. Clause (2) incorporates the constitutional test of investment backed
expectations into the appraisal process. See Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992); Agins v. Tiburen, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Clause
(3) incorporates additional language from Penn Central which is applicable to
[Vol. 50:93
76
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss1/5
TAKINGS REFORM
the determination of compensation for a constitutional taking. By their nature,
some regulations will be more invasive and give rise more directly to a right to
compensation, while other less invasive regulations would only give rise to a
right to compensation when other facts such as economic impact of the
regulation are also taken into account. Clauses (4) and (6) recognize that the
use and value of property are subject to prior limitations resulting from
nuisance law, the use of adjacent property, and so forth. Clause (5) indicates
that, when a particular future use of the property is probable, a right to
compensation may arise even if it is unsupported by substantial investment.
Clause (7) recognizes that the economic impact of a regulation depends in part
upon the remaining viable uses. The expression 'economically' is drawn from
Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. (See Lucas, Agins) Clause (8) is drawn
from existing eminent domain legislation and recognizes that the need for
compensation is offset by benefit which are conferred upon property. Clause
(9) has two purposes. First, it recognizes that the existence of liens and
encumbrances upon property often is a good indication of the property's value
or of investment backed expectation. Additionally, because any regulation
which impairs the collateral value of property is likely to cause a default or
acceleration of obligations secured by the property, this clause requires any
appraisal to take into account the compensation which would be required to
satisfy or secure existing obligations. The language is loosely patterned after
language in Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section (B) eliminates the use
of tax status of land as evidence of its value. The fact that a property owner
takes advantage of tax reductions which may be available should not affect the
owner's right to compensation when the land is acquired or regulated by the
State. Rollbacks provided for under other state law adequately provide
compensation to the State for recovery of lost revenues following a change in
tax status. Section 28-4-100. In the event that any governmental entity fails to
institute condemnation proceedings in accordance with this act and the Eminent
Domain Procedure Act when the enactment or enforcement of the regulation
has the effect of diminishing the value ofreal property, then the property owner
is entitled to bring an action for damages in inverse condemnation and is
entitled to attorney's fees in accordance with Section 28-11-30. Nothing in this
chapter shall be construed as limiting the rights of a property owner to seek
damages for inverse condemnation or constitutional takings, or to challenge the
constitutionality of any regulation.
COMMENTS
This section indicates that this act is not intended to limit property owners'
rights to compensation for constitutional takings or their right to bring inverse
condemnation claims. If the procedures created by the act are followed, the
number of such claims should be reduced because in most instances
compensation should be provided through the statutory process. Whenever the
State fails to follow the procedures of the act, the property owner would retain
the right to bring an action for damages under other law. This section also
indicates that property owners should have the same right to recover attomey's
fees when they are forced to bring actions for inverse condemnation for
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regulatory takings as presently exist in the case of physical appropriation of
property, pursuant to Section 28-11-33 of the South Carolina Code."
SECTION 2. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this act, this act takes
effect upon approval by the Governor.
4. House Bill 3591 (as originally introduced on March 4, 1997; "companion
bill": S.686 (introduced April23, 1997))
A BILL
TO AMEND TITLE 28, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976,
RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN, BY ADDING CHAPTER 4 SO AS
TO ENACT THE "SOUTH CAROLINA PROPERTY RIGHTS ACT."
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:
SECTION 1. Title 28 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"CHAPTER 4
The South Carolina Property Rights Act
Section 28-4-10. This chapter may be cited as the 'South Carolina Property
Rights Act' and any references to the term 'act,' unless the context clearly
indicates otherwise, mean the 'South Carolina Property Rights Act.'
Section 28-4-20. As used in this chapter:
(1) (a) 'Governmental action' or 'action' means:
(i) proposed or enacted laws, regulations, emergency regulations,
and ordinances by a governmental entity which by adoption or
enforcement limit the use of private property;
(ii) licensing orpermitting conditions, requirements, or limitations
on the use of private property;
(iii) required dedications or exactions from owners of private
property;
(iv) amendments to any of the above.
(b) The following actions are not included in the definition of
'governmental action' or 'action':
(i) activity in which the power of eminent domain is exercised
formally;
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(ii) repealing regulations, discontinuing governmental programs,
or amending regulations in a manner that lessens interference with
the use of private property;
(iii) law enforcement activity involving the seizure or forfeiture of
private property for a violation of law or as evidence in a criminal
proceeding;
(iv) orders and enforcement actions that are issued by a
governmental entity or a court in accordance with applicable
federal or state provisions of law;
(v) governmental action specifically mandated by a federal
governmental authority, to the extent that the action does not
result from the exercise of legislative, executive, or administrative
discretion.
(2) 'Governmental entity' means:
(a) an officer, entity, or department of state government that is
authorized to promulgate regulations;
(b) the General Assembly;
(c) a political subdivision of the State that is created by the State
Constitution or by general or special act, or a county or municipality
that independently exercises governmental authority;
(d) a special purpose district.
(3) 'Private real property' means any real property in this State that is
protected by either the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States or Article 1, Section 13 of the State
Constitution.
(4) 'Taking' or 'constitutional taking' means a governmental action that
affects private real property in a manner that requires the governmental
entity to compensate the private real property owner as provided by the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, or both, or Article 1, Section 13 of the South Carolina
Constitution.
Section 28-4-30. (A) The General Assembly declares the basic state policies
furthered by this chapter to be the recognition that land use regulation may
constitute a taking requiring compensation, and the requirement that
governmental entities follow the same procedures with respect to compensating
landowners to the event of a taking through regulation as they are required to
follow for the physical appropriation of real property under Chapter 2 of Title
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28.
(B) Specific policies which must be promoted through the implementation of
this chapter are to:
(1) provide uniform procedures for compensation when property has been
taken through regulation;
(2) reduce costly litigation which may be caused by taking claims arising
from the implementation of regulations;
(3) provide for the development and use of administrative procedures to
afford landowners alternative remedies to compensation if possible, or to
compensate landowners for a taking resulting from land use regulation;
(4) assist governmental entities in planning and budgeting for state
programs which involve the regulation of land use;
(5) provide for the efficient use of state resources in the achievement of
state objectives involving land use regulation;
(6) maximize the results of desirable regulation through cost control,
informed planning, and the avoidance of after-the-fact litigation;
(7) provide explicit guidelines for governmental entities involved in land
use regulation;
(8) protect the property rights of landowners and provide for compensation
or alternative remedies for a taking through regulation.
Section 28-4-40. (A) The Attorney General shall prepare a checklist of
guidelines to assist governmental entities in evaluating proposed governmental
action to assure that such actions do not result in a taking of private property.
(B) In establishing the guidelines, the Attorney General shall take into
consideration recent court rulings on the taking of private property. A person
may make comments or suggestions or provide information to the Attorney
General concerning the guidelines. The Attorney General shall consider the
comments, suggestions, and information in the annual review process required
by subsection (C) of this section.
(C) The Attorney General shall complete the guidelines by October 1, 1997 and
distribute them to all governmental entities. The guidelines must be filed with
Legislative Council and published in the State Register. The Attorney General
shall review the guidelines at least annually and revise them as necessary to
ensure consistency with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
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(D) The checklist of guidelines shall include, among other factors considered
appropriate by the Attorney General, the following considerations:
(1) the specific purpose of the proposed regulation;
(2) a statement as to how the proposed regulation advances that purpose;
(3) the probable effect of the proposed action on the use and value of
private property, including an evaluation of the probable cost of acquisition
of an interest in that property through enactment or enforcement of the
regulation;
(4) alternatives to the proposed action that may lessen the effect on private
property or which may involve lower probable costs to the State;
(5) the source of payment within the governmental entity's budget for such
compensation.
Section 28-4-50. To the extent reasonably possible, governmental entities shall
avoid adopting or enforcing regulations in a manner that constitutes a taking of
property under the Constitution of this State or the Constitution of the United
States.
Section 28-4-60. (A) Before the adoption or enforcement of regulations
affecting land use, governmental entities, consistent with the guidelines
established by Section 28-4-40, shall assess the proposed regulation and
prepare a written assessment which specifically and fully addresses each of the
checklist guidelines.
(B) The written assessment is public information and must be made available
by the governmental entity upon request.
Section 28-4-70. A party may not institute suit under this chapter until all
administrative remedies afforded by the applicable governmental entity are
exhausted. If the parties cannot agree to an administrative remedy, the parties
shall mediate the dispute with a mediator selected by the parties from a list of
certified mediators maintained by the South Carolina Bar, as a condition
precedent to suit. All administrative remedies and the mediation process must
be completed within one hundred eighty days from the date the aggrieved
private property owner institutes the administrative proceeding. If the matter
is not resolved within the one hundred eighty-day period, the private property
owner may commence a suit for compensation.
Section 28-4-80. (A) To avoid or resolve a dispute under this chapter, a
governmental entity is specifically authorized and empowered to recommend
one or more alternatives, consistent with applicable law that protect the public
interest served by the governmental action at issue but allow for reduced
restraints on the use of the owner's real property including, but not limited to:
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(1) an adjustment of land development or permit standards or other
provisions controlling the development or use of land;
(2) increases or modifications in the density, intensity, or use of areas of
development;
(3) the transfer of development rights;
(4) land swaps or exchanges;
(5) mitigation, including payments in lieu of onsite mitigation;
(6) location on the least sensitive portion of the property;
(7) conditioning the amount of development or use permitted;
(8) a requirement that issues be addressed on a more comprehensive basis
than a single proposed use or development;
(9) issuance of a variance, special exception, or other extraordinary relief,
including withdrawal of the proposed action;
(10) purchases of the real property, or an interest in it, by an appropriate
governmental entity.
(B) This section does not prohibit the owner and governmental entity from
entering into an agreement as to the permissible use of the property prior to the
administrative agency or mediator entering a recommendation.
Section 28-4-90. (A) Sovereign immunity shall not be a defense to an action
brought pursuant to this chapter.
(B) A person who has a claim under this chapter may sue the State or a
governmental entity, as provided by this chapter, to:
(1) recover damages;
(2) invalidate a governmental action; or
(3) recover damages and invalidate a governmental action.
(C) This chapter does not preclude a person from electing to pursue a claim
under the United States Constitution in the federal court having proper
jurisdiction.
Section 284-100. (A) After the parties have exhausted the applicable
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governmental entity's administrative remedies and the mediation process
prescribed by this chapter, an aggrieved private real property owner may bring
suit de novo to recover compensation for a taking. A suit under this chapter
must be filed in a court which has jurisdiction of statutory eminent domain
actions in the county in which the private rel property owner's affected
property is located. If the affected private real property is located in more than
one county, the private real property owner may file suit in any county in which
the affected property is located and demand ajury trial to determine all factual
issues.
(B) A suit under this chapter must be filed not later than three years after the
date the private real property owner knew or would have known that the
alleged taking had occurred.
Section 28-4-110. (A) Whether a governmental action results in a taking is a
question of fact.
(B) The compensation owed to the private real property owner in a suit under
this chapter must be determined from the date of the taking and is the
difference between the market value of the private real property, determiined as
though the governmental action is not in effect, and the market value of the
private real property determined as though the governmental action is in effect.
(C) The trier of fact, in determining the diminution in market value, may not
consider an injury or benefit that is sustained or enjoyed in similar degree by
private real property owners in the general community unless the governmental
action imposes a direct physical or legal restriction on the use of the property.
(D) If the trier of fact determines that a governmental action resulted in a
taking, and the governmental action has ceased or has been rescinded,
amended, invalidated, or repealed, the private real property owner may recover
compensation in an amount equal to the temporary orpermanent economic loss
sustained while the governmental action was in effect.
(E) The court shall award a private real property owner who prevails in a suit
under this chapter reasonable and necessary attomey's fees, expert witness fees,
court costs, and prejudgment interest. Prejudgement interest under this
subsection must be calculated from the date of the taking.
Section 28-4-120. (A) The court's judgment in favor of a private real property
owner in a suit under this chapter shall:
(1) order the governmental entity or the Attorney General, as appropriate,
to certify to the court whether all compensation, fees, costs, and interest
owed under this chapter have been paid;
(2) enjoin the governmental entity from enforcing or continuing the
governmental action as applied to the private real property owner until the
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date the governmental entity or the Attorney General, as appropriate,
certifies to the court that all compensation, fees, costs, and interest owed
under this chapter have been paid.
(B) A judgment awarding compensation to a private real property owner who
prevails in a suit against a governmental entity under this chapter is subject to
an appropriation by the appropriate funding agency."
SECTION 2. Except as otherwise provided in this act, this act takes effect upon
approval by the Governor and applies to governmental action, as defined in
Section 28-4-20(1) of the 1976 Code as contained in Section 1 of this act,
which is first proposed or enacted on September 1, 1997 and thereafter.
5. House Bill 3591 (as amended and adopted by House on May 28, 1997)
A BILL
TO AMEND TITLE 28, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976,
RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN, BY ADDING CHAPTER 4 SO AS
TO ENACT THE "SOUTH CAROLINA PROPERTY RIGHTS ACT."
Amend Title To Conform
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:
SECTION 1. Title 28 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"CHAPTER 4
The South Carolina Private Property
Rights Protection Act
Section 28-4-10. This chapter may be cited as the 'South Carolina Private
Property Rights Protection Act' and any references to the term 'act', unless the
context clearly indicates otherwise, mean the 'South Carolina Private Property
Rights Protection Act.'
Section 28-4-20. The General Assembly recognizes that some laws,
regulations, and ordinances of the State and political subdivisions of the State,
as applied, may inordinately burden, restrict, or limit private property rights
without amounting to a taking under the State Constitution or the United States
Constitution. The General Assembly determines that there is an important state
interest in protecting the interests of private property owners from such
inordinate burdens. Therefore, it is the intent of the General Assembly that as
a separate and distinct cause of action from the law of takings, the General
Assembly in this chapter provides for relief or payment of compensation when
a new law, regulation, or ordinance of the State or of a political subdivision of
the State, as applied, unfairly affects real property.
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Section 28-4-30. (A) When a specific action of a governmental entity has
inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a vested right to a
specific use of real property, the property owner of that real property is entitled
to relief, which may include compensation for the actual loss to the fair market
value of the real property caused by the action of government, as provided in
this section.
(13) For purposes of this section:
(1) The existence of a 'vested right' is to be determined by applying the
principles of equitable estoppel or substantive due process under the
common law or by applying the statutory law of this State.
(2) The term 'existing use' means an actual present use or activity on the
real property including periods of inactivity which are normally associated
with, or are incidental to, the nature or type of use or activity or such
reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses which are suitable for the
subject real property and compatible with adjacent land uses and which
have created an existing fair market value in the property greater than the
fair market value of the actual present use or activity on the real property.
(3) The term 'governmental entity' includes an agency of the State, a
regional or a local government created by the State Constitution or by act
of the General Assembly, any county, or municipality, or any other entity
that independently exercises governmental authority. The term does not
include the United States or any of its agencies, or an agency of the State,
a regional or a local government created by the State Constitution or by act
of the General Assembly, any county or municipality, or any other entity
that independently exercises governmental authority, when exercising the
powers of the United States or any of its agencies through a formal
delegation of federal authority.
(4) The term 'action of a governmental entity' means a specific action of
a governmental entity which affects real property including action on an
application or permit.
(5) The terms 'inordinate burden' or 'inordinately burdened' mean that an
action of one or more governmental entities has directly restricted or
limited the use of real property such that the property owner is unable to
attain the reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the existing use
of the real property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property
with the respect to the real property as a whole, or that the property owner
is left with existing or vested use that are unreasonable such that the
property owner bears a disproportionate share of aburden imposed for the
good of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at
large. The terms 'inordinate burden' or 'inordinately burdened' do not
include temporary impacts to real property; impacts to real property
occasioned by governmental abatement, prohibition, prevention, or
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remediation of a public nuisance at common law or a noxious use of
private property; impacts to real property caused by an action of a
governmental entity taken to grant relief to a property owner under this
section; or any action of a governmental entity affecting either the location
of any type of solid or liquid waste disposal facility (or the discharge
therefrom) or landfill or expansion of any existing solid or liquid waste
disposal facility (or the discharge therefrom) or landfill.
(6) The term 'property owner' means the person who holds legal title to the
real property at issue. The term does not include a governmental entity.
(7) The term 'real property' means land and includes any appurtenances
and improvements to the land including any other relevant real property in
which the property owner had a relevant interest.
(C) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent the exercise of the police
powers of any governmental entity to adopt or modify lawful zoning
ordinances or comprehensive land use plans consistent with the provisions of
this chapter.
Section 28-4-40. (A) Not less than one hundred eighty days prior to filing an
action under this section against a governmental entity, a property owner who
seeks compensation under this section must present the claim in writing to the
head of the governmental entity. The property owner must submit along with
the claim a bona fide, valid appraisal that supports the claim and demonstrates
the loss in fair market value to the real property. If the action of government is
the culmination of a process that involves more than one governmental entity,
or if a complete resolution of all relevant issues, in the view of the property
owner or in the view of a governmental entity to whom a claim is presented,
requires the active participation of more than one governmental entity, the
property owner shall present the claim as provided in this section to each of the
governmental entities.
(B) The governmental entity shall provide written notice of the claim to all
parties to any administrative action that gave rise to the claim, and to owners
of real property contiguous to the owner's property at the addresses listed on
the most recent county tax rolls.
(C) During the one hundred eighty-day-notice period, unless extended by
agreement of the parties, the governmental entity shall make a written
settlement offer to effectuate:
(1) an adjustment of land development or permit standards or other
provisions controlling the development or use of land;
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(3) the transfer of developmental rights;
(4) land swaps or exchanges;
(5) mitigation, including payments in lieu of onsite mitigation;
(6) location on the least sensitive portion of the property;
(7) conditioning the amount of development or use permitted;
(8) a requirement that issues be addressed on a more comprehensive basis
than a single proposed use or development;
(9) issuance of the development permit, a variance, special exception, or
other extraordinary relief;
(10) purchase of the real property, or an interest in the real property,
including development rights, by an appropriate governmental entity;
(11) no changes to the action of the governmental entity.
If the property owner accepts the settlement offer, the governmental entity may
implement the settlement offer by appropriate development agreement; by
issuing a variance, special exception, or other extraordinary relief, or by other
appropriate method, subject to subsection (D).
(D) (1) Whenever a governmental entity enters into a settlement agreement
under this section which would have the effect of a modification, variance,
or a special exception to the application of a regulation or ordinance as it
would otherwise apply to the subject real property, the relief granted shall
protect the public interest served by the regulations at issue and be the
appropriate relief necessary to prevent the governmental regulatory effort
from inordinately burdening the real property.
(2) Whenever a governmental entity enters into a settlement agreement
under this section which would have the effect of contravening the
application of a statute as it would otherwise apply to the subject real
property, the governmental entity and the property owner shall jointly file
an action in the circuit court where the real property is located for approval
of the settlement agreement by the court to ensure that the relief granted
protects the public interest served by the statute at issue and is the
appropriate relief necessary to prevent the governmental regulatory effort
from inordinately burdening the real property.
Section 28-4-50. (A) During the one hundred eighty-day-notice period
provided for in Section 28-4-40, unless a settlement offer is accepted by the
property owner, each of the governmental entities provided notice pursuant to
Section 28-4-40(A) shall issue a written ripeness decision identifying the
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allowable uses to which the subject property may be put. The failure of the
governmental entity to issue a written ripeness decision during the one hundred
eighty-day-notice period must be deemed to ripen the prior action of the
governmental entity and shall operate as a ripeness decision that has been
rejected by the property owner. The ripeness decision, as a matter of law,
constitutes the last prerequisite to judicial review, and the matter must be
deemed ripe or finalfor the purposes of the judicial proceeding created by this
section, notwithstanding the availability of other administrative remedies.
(B) If the property owner rejects the settlement offer and the ripeness decision
of the governmental entity or entities, the property owner may file a claim for
compensation in the circuit court, a copy of which must be served
contemporaneously on the head of each of the governmental entities that made
a settlement offer and a ripeness decision that was rejected by the property
owner. Actions under this section must be brought only in the county where the
real property is located.
Section 28-4-60. (A) The circuit court shall determine whether an existing use
of the real property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property
existed and, if so, whether considering the settlement offer and ripeness
decision, the governmental entity or entities have inordinately burdened the real
property. If the actions of more than one governmental entity, considering any
settlement offers and ripeness decisions, are responsible for the action that
imposed the inordinate burden on the real property of the property owner, the
court shall determine the percentage of responsibility each governmental entity
bears with respect to the inordinate burden. A governmental entity may take an
interlocutory appeal of the court's determination that the action of the
governmental entity has resulted in an inordinate burden. An interlocutory
appeal does not automatically stay the proceedings; however, the court may
stay the proceedings during the pendency of the interlocutory appeal. If the
governmental entity does not prevail in the interlocutory appeal, the court shall
award to the prevailing property owner the costs and a reasonable attorney fee
incurred by the property owner in the interlocutory appeal.
(B) Following its determination of the percentage of responsibility of each
governmental entity, and following the resolution of any interlocutory appeal,
the court shall impanel a jury to determine the total amount of compensation
to the property owner for the loss in value due to the inordinate burden to the
real property. The award of compensation must be determined by calculating
the difference in the fair market value of the real property, as it existed at the
time of the governmental action at issue, as though the owner had the ability to
attain the reasonable investment-backed expectation or was not left with uses
that are unreasonable, whichever the case may be, and the fair market value of
the real property, as it existed at the time of the governmental action at issue,
as inordinately burdened, considering the settlement offer together with the
ripeness decision, of the governmental entity or entities. In determining the
award of compensation, consideration may not be given to business damages
relative to any development, activity, or use that the action of the governmental
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entity or entities, considering the settlement offer together with the ripeness
decision has restricted, limited, or prohibited. The award of compensation shall
include a reasonable award of prejudgment interest from the date the claim was
presented to the governmental entity or entities.
(C) (1) In any action filed pursuant to this section, the property owner is
entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by the
property owner, from the governmental entity or entities, according to their
proportionate share as determined by the court, from the date of the filing
of the circuit court action, if the property owner prevails in the action and
the court determines that the settlement offer, including the ripeness
decision, of the governmental entity or entities did not constitute a bona
fide offer to the property owner which reasonably would have resolved the
claim, based upon the knowledge available to the governmental entity or
entities and the property owner during the one hundred eighty-day-notice
period.
(2) In any action filed pursuant to this section, the governmental entity or
entities are entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred
by the governmental entity or entities from the date of the filing of the
circuit court action, if the governmental entity or entities prevail in the
action and the court determines that the property owner did not accept a
bona fide settlement offer, including the ripeness decision, which
reasonably would have resolved the claim fairly to the property owner if
the settlement offer had been accepted by the property owner, based upon
the knowledge available to the governmental entity or entities and the
property owner during the one hundred eighty-day-notice period.
(3) The determination of total reasonable costs and attorney fees pursuant
to this subsection must be made by the court and not by the jury. Any
proposed settlement offer or any proposed ripeness decision, except for the
final written settlement offer or the final written ripeness decision, and any
negotiations or rejections in regard to the formulation either of the
settlement offer or the ripeness decision, are inadmissible in the subsequent
proceeding established by this section except for the purposes of the
determination pursuant to this subsection.
(D) The circuit court may enter any orders necessary to effectuate the purposes
of this section and to make final determinations to effectuate relief available
under this section.
(B) An award or payment of compensation pursuant to this section shall operate
to grant to and vest in any governmental entity by whom compensation is paid
the right, title, and interest in rights of use for which the compensation has been
paid, which rights may become transferable development rights to be held,
sold, or otherwise disposed of by the governmental entity. When there is an
award of compensation, the court shall determine the form and the recipient of
the right, title, and interest, as well as the terms of their acquisition.
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(F) This section does not supplant methods agreed to by the parties and
lawfully available for arbitration, mediation, or other forms of alternative
dispute resolution, and governmental entities are encouraged to utilize these
methods to augment or facilitate the processes and actions contemplated by this
section.
(G) This section provides a cause of action for governmental actions that may
not rise to the level of a taking under the State Constitution or the United States
Constitution. This section may not necessarily be construed under the case law
regarding takings if the governmental action does not rise to the level of a
taking. The provisions of this section are cumulative and do not abrogate any
other remedy lawfully available, including any remedy lawfully available for
governmental actions that rise to the level of a taking. However, a
governmental entity is not liable for compensation for an action of a
governmental entity applicable to, or for the loss in value to, a subject real
property more than once for the same inordinate burden.
(H) This section does not apply to any actions taken by a governmental entity
which relate to the operation, maintenance, or expansion of transportation
facilities, and this section does not affect existing law regarding eminent
domain relating to transportation.
(I) A cause of action may not be commenced under this section if the claim is
presented more than one year after a law or regulation is first applied by the
governmental entity to the property at issue. If an owner seeks relief from the
governmental action through lawfully available administrative or judicial
proceedings, the time for bringing an action under this section is tolled until the
conclusion of those proceedings.
(J) No cause of action exists under this section as to the application of any law
enacted on or before July 1, 1997, or as to the application of any regulation or
ordinance adopted, or formally noticed for adoption, on or before that date. A
subsequent amendment to any such law, regulation, or ordinance gives rise to
a cause of action under this section only to the extent that the application of the
amendatory language imposes an inordinate burden apart from the law,
regulation, or ordinance being amended.
(K) This section does not affect the sovereign immunity of government to the
extent that sovereign immunity of government exists in this State."
SECTION 2. This act takes effect July 1, 1997.
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